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 Preface 
The background for this thesis was laid out in 2005. At the time I started preparing my Master’s 
thesis at the Helsinki University of Technology and work with researcher Matti Perttula. This 
thesis for the degree of Master of Arts at University of Helsinki was completed later the same 
year. My stay with the product development research group lasted until early 2006 and 
produced the first three publication included in this thesis. After this I ventured to the University 
of Helsinki to work on cognitive brain research and the remaining publications of this thesis 
were prepared sporadically. Until 2008, I never thought that this dissertation would be written. 
However, things evolved so that I started preparing this thesis in early 2009. A personal grant 
from Wihuri foundation (Antti ja Jenni Wihurin säätiö) made it possible for me to get involved 
in the writing. This grant is greatly acknowledged as the completion of this thesis would have 
been impossible without it. I am also thankful for the flexibility of my present organization, 
Helsinki Institute for Information Technology HIIT (joint venture of Helsinki University of 
Technology TKK and University of Helsinki) and its former co-director Professor Martti 
Mäntylä and his successor Professor Heikki Mannila who allowed me to divide my time 
between ongoing research projects and thesis writing.  
As this work was being written from January to June 2009, I worked for a Tekes funded 
Theseus project, which also facilitated the production of this thesis. The collaboration with 
Theseus researcher community at Jyväskylä University and VTT Tampere facilitated my work 
and opened up new perspectives for it. In particular, I thank Adjunct Professor Antti Oulasvirta 
(HIIT) and Professor Pertti Saariluoma (University of Jyväskylä) for their guidance and 
encouragement in the process. Since December 2008 I refreshed contacts to the local product 
design community. Aalto University pilot Design factory lead by Professor Kalevi Ekman 
allowed me kindly to work in their new premises and meet people interested in design thinking, 
innovation management, and industrial creativity. Prof. Ekman has also supervised this 
dissertation. Finally, I acknowledge the peer-support from the researcher Salu Ylirisku working 
at the Industrial design department of Helsinki University of Art Design (TAIK) for several 
enlightening discussions about the nature conceptual design during the spring. I look forward 
reading his dissertation in the near future. 
There were many people involved in the preparation of the original publications and in the 
development of design theory within. I initially worked in the Navigo research project at the 
Helsinki University of Technology, funded by the Academy of Finland. The empirical 
investigations were carried out in close collaboration with Matti Perttula, who later claimed his 
doctorate. Designer Pekka Sipilä and prof. Ekman had also an important role in Navigo. 
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 Although the majority of empirical work was carried out in 2005, I kept on with the analyses 
and distillation of data for a couple of years.  
As my affiliation with Navigo came to an end in early 2006, I maintained connections to a few 
other design researchers. In particular, MSc Sauli Honkala helped during the preparation of the 
manuscript that was later accepted into Journal of Engineering Design. That paper built on 
previous work with Perttula, but needed a fresh theoretical perspective. University of Helsinki 
and the Department of Psychology at the time kindly provided help in the form of infrastructure 
during the writing processes. Especially I acknowledge the long-term support from Professor 
Heikki Summala and the Traffic research unit. I am also thankful for the brief period spent in 
Cognitive Science unit in 2007, where I worked with PhD Pauli Brattico and researcher Alina 
Leminen.  
In 2007 I started working at the HIIT and developed new interests to idea generation and 
conceptual design, partially due to the influence of Professor Lars-Erik Holmquist. 
Consequentially, I desired to make a stance on a highly practical issue, time management, 
before kicking off the dissertation project and so I analyzed the literature on time constraints in 
January 2009. I transformed this analysis into a manuscript and with the helpful comments from 
Tua Björklund, Matti M. Hämäläinen, and Mikko Koskinen, all working in and around 
Design Factory. The last step in the process was the revision of the dissertation manuscript 
which prepared during the time I was enjoying doctoral student funding from the Faculty of 
Engineering and Architecture at TKK. During this time, I also studied under the supervision 
of Professor Matti Vartiainen (TKK) topics related to psychology of organizations and 
innovation. The final and likely the biggest impact to of this work was made both examiners of 
the thesis. I am very grateful for receiving comments to my manuscript from Professor Bernard 
A. Nijstad and Professor Jami J. Shah. I consider both of the most acknowledgeable people to 
comment this work and their participation was highly appreciated and valuable. 
Having now walked you through the history of this dissertation, the list of acknowledgements 
was already quite long. However, above all I must express my gratitude to my closest family, 
especially Riikka, for the support during the years of exploration in the rough waters of 
scientific research and publication.  
Thank you all! 
 
December 2009, in Helsinki, Finland 
 
Lassi A. Liikkanen 
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1 Introduction 
At the end of the first decade of the third millennium, design research is in a state bewilderment. 
The past decades have introduced a number of movements in design methodology and research. 
Similarly design thinking and theorizing have transformed to several directions which have very 
little to do with each other. No leading theory and methodology has emerged, and according to 
industrial design theorist Krippendorff (2006), the old ones have faded and what remains is a 
strange mixture of multiple old fashions. One consequence of this is the tragedy that design 
research currently produces very little accumulative knowledge (Norman, 2009). However, even 
if there is and has been confusion among design researchers and theorists, there is no denying 
that many excellent products have been designed during the past 30 years. 
This confusion of design research stems from multiple sources. Decades ago design researchers 
thought they had been able to define what design is, how it should be characterized, and what 
methods best suite design practice. Some years later many methodologists had to revise their 
beliefs (Cross, 1984) and became skeptical of design science. It is also evident that the 
requirements for designers’ practical work have radically changed in few decades. Be it 
industrial or mechanical design, the complexity of designed artifacts has evolved from 
designing individual products, nuts and bolts, into designing meaning, interaction, brands, 
projects, and even discourses (Krippendorff, 2006; see Figure 1.1 below).  
 
Despite difficulties in establishing firm design tools, the cult of the method men has not died 
out. Even if design theorists have not taken in any new methodological beliefs, it seems that the 
concrete achievements of design may nourish the idea design is plain work and thus any skilled 
Figure 1.1 The expansion of designer’s responsibilities from defining products to 
designing semantics (meanings) based on Krippendorff (2006). 
 and experienced practitioner may feel free to present their beliefs and methods about design. Of 
course it is perfectly legal and even recommended to disseminate the proceedings of good 
design practices into the world. However, these best practices, maybe grounded in compelling 
and glorious experiences, can be fitting to their own setting, but can we trust to follow them 
blindly? Do they provide enough evidence about their qualities? In this thesis I defend the 
perspective that a theoretical understanding of design, a science of design, can facilitate the 
evaluation and the development of design methodology, and can therefore ultimately lead to 
better products.  
The research question I consider in this work is what sort of mental information processes are 
required to produce simple ideas in the early phases of design. As an answer, I will provide a 
cognitive theory of design work, built upon the symbolic, problem-solving view of design. This 
theory is developed from a series of theoretical and empirical exploration into the nature of idea 
generation (IG) in design, but also considering other creative domains. The aim is to provide 
insights about the structure of design IG as creative work and investigate how it might be best 
supported. I do not claim to close the distances between practice, methods, and theory as I will 
also point out the inherent difficulties in the application of this theory and acknowledge the 
limited scope of the present approach. The notion of creativity in this thesis must also be 
understood as simple, everyday generativity, or personal creativity rather than revolutionary, 
cultural, or historical creativity commonly equated with the term (Boden, 2004). 
In this first chapter, I start by reviewing the state of design and research, analyzing the existing 
design thinking approaches, introducing concepts relevant for design cognition, and outlining 
the work. In the second chapter, I review selected literature about empirical research on design, 
theoretical models of design IG, and the prominent empirical findings so far. The third chapter 
presents thesis’ main argument which is a synthesis of the previous work. This cognitive theory 
of design IG process is presented as a heuristic, algorithmic cognitive model. The model 
combines elements from the publications and presents a conceptualization of how new ideas can 
be created in the early phases of the design process. In the final chapter I conclude this work by 
evaluating my contribution to the design cognition community along with its limitations. I also 
propose some open questions that should be studied in the future, and consider whether a 
change of paradigm in design thinking is desired or already happening. Together these chapters 
aim to provide a rich description about what IG in product design currently is, and what it may 
turn into in the future.  
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 1.1 Design and Studies 
What is design and how can it be investigated? Design surrounds us in a western society where 
our daily life revolves around a composition of artifacts. In the 21st century, it is not uncommon 
that people already live their lives and construct their identities inside one of the greatest 
artifacts, the Internet. Therefore, design might be labeled as the science of the artificial (Simon, 
1969). In his seminal work, Simon argued that design is about “changing existing situations into 
preferred ones.” This defines design by a reference to existing and preferred states of affairs, 
but it also mentions an action, change from a state to state. While this definition leaves little 
room for disagreement, it also remains quite abstract.  
In engineering design, there are several widely used text books that all include their own 
definitions of design. Starting from a senior proponent of design methodology, Archer provides 
an elegant three-part description design (Archer, 1965). According to him design is an activity 
that produces “a prescription or model for a finished work in advance of its embodiment.” The 
elements are thus prescription and expectation of the embodiment. The third necessary 
condition is that the outcome must have some level of novelty in order to be considered as a 
product of a design process (design vs. replication). Archer’s definition clearly has some merit, 
but has problems dealing with the types of conceptual design that provide no embodiment or 
with prototyping that produces the embodiments almost ahead of the design (see p. 28). 
Pioneers of the German mechanical engineering tradition, Pahl and Beitz define design as an 
application of “scientific and engineering knowledge to the solution of technical problems.” 
This takes place in a process where solutions are optimized within “requirements and 
constraints set by material, technological, economic, legal, environmental and human-related 
considerations.” (Pahl, Beitz, Feldhusen, & Grote, 2007, p. 1). This might stand as an accurate 
description of what engineering design has been some time ago. From an American perspective 
of design thinking, Ulrich and Eppinger (2008) provide a description of product design, in 
which “[design] plays the lead role in defining the physical form of the product to best meet the 
customer needs. In this context, the design function includes engineering design (mechanical, 
electrical, software, etc.) and industrial design (aesthetics, ergonomics, user interfaces).”  
I believe that all referenced descriptions of design capture some parts of design, but my view is 
closest to Archer’s. In the context of this work, I see design as intentional human activity 
attempting to create something novel and desired, regardless of the exact physical outcome. 
The Pahl and Beitz view is unacceptable because it is too rigid and sees design an optimization 
problem (see 1.4.2). The Ulrich and Eppinger definition is too product centered and too limited 
in taking the customer needs as a given variable. 
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 1.1.1 Research and design 
After providing some estimates what design is, the next step is find out how to study it. I will 
start the discussion about research and design by looking at how scientific thinking about design 
has evolved this far. A short history of how we have come to this is presented by Cross (1984). 
In his edition about design methodology he describes four generation of design thinking, with 
particular flavors indicated in parentheses: 
1) 1962-1967 Design methods movement (prescription) 
2) 1966-1973 Figuring out the design problem (description) 
3) Late 70’s Analyzing the nature of design activity (observation) 
4) 1972 – 1982  Philosophy of the design methods (reflection) 
Even if this only presents an arbitrary 20 years block from history, it also presents a regression 
from prescriptive, rational positivism to descriptive, critical reflections. Unfortunately there are 
no comprehensive reviews of the later period, which is strange considering the short history of 
this art. For instance, Design research society was established in 1966 after in 1962 the first 
conference on design methods was held and considered a success (Cross, 2007). Important and 
more recent step was the introduction of Design Studies journal in 1979, which has served to 
consolidate the design research discipline; although it questionable has the field become any 
more cohere since then. The continued interest in design methods and research was also indexed 
by two design conference series that started in 1980’s; American Society for Mechanical 
Engineering’s Design engineering technical conference ASME DETC (1989) and International 
Conference on Engineering Design (ICED since 1981) currently run by Design Society, both 
still going strong.  
Talking about design as a research subject also calls for determining some approach for design 
research. My intention is not to exhaust all insightful design theorists. I have chosen to quote 
Fallman, who has recently analyzed the area of interaction design using a triangular model of 
design research (Fallman, 2008). His model is illustrated in Figure 1.2 on the next page. His 
framework positions design using three pivot points: design research or studies, art and 
exploration, and design practice. He argues that design research typically creates a trajectory or 
a loop that touches the two of these ends. 
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Figure 1.2 Triangular model that positions design research by Fallman (2008; 
adaptation of Figure 1) showing how research can connect to other design activities. 
In the model of Fallman (2008), design research is a distinct activity with the goal of 
understanding and explaining design. Design research serves principally the interests of the 
scientific community. Through scientific methods, design research attempts to produce new 
knowledge about design. This makes design research distinct from the explorative and practical 
dimensions of design. According to Fallman explorative or artistic design seeks to provoke 
thoughts of critics and citizens at large by displaying new and radical ideas. It seeks to transcend 
the existing state-of-the-art and explore possible futures. Design practice aims to create and 
refine artifacts that please the customer. The success of this practice is dependent on designs 
that should be understandable for large publics and customers. Management writer Drucker 
(1993) would call this requirement receptivity. 
The research corner of Fallman’s triangle still leaves plenty of room for research to operate in. 
Krippendorff (2006) has analyzed the spectrum of different research interests. Building on the 
definitions provided by Cross (2000), he proposes three categories of research action: science of 
design, science for design, and design science. Starting from the last, Krippendorff argues that 
design science as a systematic and scientific inquiry into how one should design things was tried 
and did not provide the desired outcome (referring to the design methods movement). Science of 
design refers to the investigations of design in which the motivation originates from some other 
discipline, say sociology, cognitive psychology, or artificial intelligence. Design is studied to 
see how it is best described by some scientific discourse. For Krippendorff this kind of inquiry 
builds knowledge about design, but not necessarily for designers. Finally, science for design is a 
type of research that refers to a continuous self-reflective reproduction of design practices that 
have been found beneficial by a systematic review and evaluation. Krippendorff sees that this 
kind of inquiry best serves the interests of the design community and the development of design 
discourse. 
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 1.1.2 What is it to design? 
As the previous paragraphs provided some generic account of what it is to design, the next step 
is to introduce a more extensive vocabulary for describing design activity. What kinds of 
vocabularies have been used in design and how do they differ? If we start with descriptions that 
are especially about design, I again refer to Fallman (2003) who has analyzed different 
approaches to design. According to him, the approaches fall into three categories: conservative, 
pragmatic, and romantic. However, these terms have some unwanted connotations and I prefer 
to call ‘conservative’ rational, ‘pragmatic’ situated, and ‘romantic’ inspirational. The reason is 
that these terms have more appropriate equivalents in psychological and social theories of 
creativity (e.g. in Weisberg, 2006) than the labels Fallman has chosen. These accounts populate 
Table 1.1 below. 
Table 1.1 Three accounts of design by Fallman (2003) reorganized and relabeled.  
Definition of  Rational account Situated account Inspirational account 
Designer An information 
processor; a ‘glass 
box’ 
A reflective, know-how, a 
self-organizing system 
A creative, imaginative 
genius; an artist; a ‘black 
box’  
Design 
problem 
Ill-defined and 
unstructured, to be 
defined 
Unique to the situation, to 
be set by the designer 
Subordinate to the final 
product 
Process A rational search 
process; fully 
transparent 
A reflective conversion, a 
dialogue 
Largely opaque, 
mystical 
Design 
knowledge 
Guidelines, design 
methods, scientific 
laws 
How each problem should 
be tackled, compound 
seeing, experience 
Creativity, imagination, 
craft, drawing 
Product A result of the 
process 
An outcome of the 
dialogue 
A functional piece of art 
Resemblance Engineering, 
optimization 
Bricolage, human sciences, 
sociology 
Art, music, poetry, 
drama 
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 Fallman (2003) argues that the rational perspective describes the design process as a disciplined 
application of methods. The careful use of design methodology enables the designer to produce 
solutions to design problems. In detail, it is assumed that the process starts from a set of 
requirements and in a rational, transparent way proceeds towards the design solution. The key 
behaviors in design are analysis of the problem and synthesis of a solution. It is assumed that 
the design methods can be learned and successfully applied to all problems. Described in this 
way, this view resembles Krippendorff’s design science mentioned earlier.  
According to the situated account, “design is about being engaged directly in a specific design 
situation.” (Fallman, 2003 p. 227) In this account designers do not solve problems, instead they 
become engaged in a process of interpreting, framing (Ylirisku, Halttunen, Nuojua, & Juustila, 
2009), and making meaning out of the design situation. In a reflective practice (Schön, 1995) 
designers embrace the design situation and try to make most out of it by examining the situation 
from multiple perspectives. Hence the required skill is a not problem-solving technique, but 
designer’s success depends on constant self-reflection and evaluation. The skills of the designer 
are intuitive and tacit, the designer carries out design like other people carry out their daily 
routines. As a research approach, this seems most compatible with Krippendorff’s science for 
design. 
The third account of design from Fallman is inspirational. This account presents designer 
through a stereotype of creative genius. The designer may be inspired by the design challenge 
and the situation, but design itself involves something mystical. In this view, design is not 
something that could be scientifically grasped or turned into a method. The creative spark is 
something that comes and goes without a explanation, in a similar way to creative inspiration 
provided to ancient Greek poets by a muse, the offspring of Mnemosyne, the goddess of 
memory. 
Although the analysis of Fallman has a merit for capturing a variety of attitudes to design, it has 
some issues. The primary question is that are these accounts valid descriptions of what 
researchers taking interest in design thinking would subscribe to descriptions? Is there external 
validity? This seems especially problematic with the inspirational account, although some 
interaction designers, such as Gaver, seem to hold these kinds of views (Gaver, Dunne, & 
Pacenti, 1999; but see Zimmerman, Forlizzi, & Evenson, 2007). From Fallman’s description, it 
is clear to see that the rational account of design is connected to cognitive psychology and 
design cognition. In cognitive psychology, design has been considered as problem solving. 
Compared to some more distinct problem areas, such as chess or mathematics, design has been 
labeled as ill-structured problem domain (Newell, 1969; Simon, 1969, 1973), ill-defined 
(Reitman, 1965) or wicked (Rittel & Webber, 1973). This ill-structured nature of design 
problems denotes that solving them is different from solving well-structured problems as they 
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 are incompletely defined, with evolving constraints and vague initial and goal states. These 
concepts will be presented in 1.4.2. 
Secondly, what are the relations of the account theorically? Can the different accounts co-exist 
or are they mutually exclusive. For instance, could the inspirational account be turned into a 
scientific theory? Is either rational or situated account more accurate or are they just describing 
different sides of the same coin? These questions will remain open for the rest of the 
introduction, but I will refer to them in the following chapters. I see that they nicely illustrate 
the different attitudes that are displayed in design theorizing. For now, it should be stated that 
the view of design promoted in this dissertation is closest to rational, but with a desire to merge 
with the situated account.  
1.1.3 Design cognition research 
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the science of design. In this thesis, I study 
conceptual product design from a design cognition perspective. Design cognition is a relatively 
new and open set of explanatory concepts and methods for describing design. As the name 
implies, it is based on the cognitive theories of behavior and mind (e.g. as in Johnson-Laird, 
1980; Norman, 1981; Pylyshyn, 1984), providing psychological theories from an information-
processing point of view. When cognitive science emerged during 1970’s, the idea of a 
psychological description of design followed soon after (Thomas & Carroll, 1979). The term 
‘design cognition’ first appeared in 1990’s when the term was utilized by Oxman and Oxman 
(1992) and Lloyd et alia (1995), although studies that would meet criteria had been published 
earlier on (e.g. in Lawson, 1979). In 1994, Oxman and Lloyd’s papers, Georgia University of 
Technology in United States organized a workshop called Design Cognition and Design 
Education Workshop. Lot of new theorizing has since emerged applying various cognitive 
approaches that could be labeled as design cognition, but no coherent and unanimously accepted 
theory of design as cognitive activity exists to date. 
Why do we need design cognition or psychology? For several reasons, I believe we can benefit 
from design cognition. First, design cognition aims to produce scientific theories of design and 
thus inform design thinking. It contacts our ‘need to know’ by providing new descriptions of 
design as a human activity, revealing aspects of design that would otherwise remain unknown. 
Secondly, design cognition can via methodology development and education contribute to 
design praxis, or doing. In the face of numerous new design methods and in the constant 
pressure to be more creative, practitioners and organizations need objective information to help 
steering the development of design practices. Design cognition presents a rational stance to 
design and in particular to design methods, a way to study methods, to establish design practices 
based on firm evidence and testable theory. 
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 1.2 Scope 
This dissertation focuses on a presenting a cognitive model of IG in the context of early product 
design. Idea generation is defined in a narrow sense to include activities that aim at producing a 
large amount of concept candidates, without selection, evaluation, or reflection on the ideas. 
During the early design process, the ideas are preliminary, abstract, and often not very 
convincing. This thesis is primarily theoretical, although heavily grounded in scientific literature 
and empirical observations documented in the constituent publications. The discussion included 
in this thesis follows these publications, which consider several aspects of design, but in this 
thesis I will concentrate in the cognitive core of design. 
This thesis can also be defined by exclusion of several associated topics, which were not 
considered crucial enough. This work is not about individual differences in creativity, process 
models of design, development of new design methodologies, or an establishment of new 
cognitive vocabulary. This work does neither concern innovations nor their management. An 
innovation, which can be defined as an idea that can be commercially exploited (Rogers, 1995), 
is not considered to be particularly different from other ideas. It is assumed that the difference 
between an innovation, an invention and ‘just an idea’ is not psychological, it is practical and 
culture or market-determined. The psychological processes related to turning ideas into 
innovations are excluded from this work. 
It needs to be emphasized that my formulation of ‘ideas’ and ‘idea generation’ is also a rather 
clinical one. In contrast to everyday discourse, idea here does not refer to a particularly novel, 
outstanding, or ground breaking discovery. In studies of idea generation conducted in research 
laboratories, ideas are often very simple, everyday, and conventional. Ideas that are collected 
experimentally can even have probability distributions! Of course, some of the ideas can be 
exceptional, but that is not a criteria here.  
As there are several quite distinct areas of design, a question arises how domain independent are 
theories of design? To what extent are theories of architecture also applicable to software 
engineering? This is a very important question that has also been considered in the literature 
(Akin, 2001; Visser, 2009). I have chosen to include studies from several areas of design and I 
will discuss the consequences of this decision in the Conclusions chapter. A related issue is that 
this thesis is specifically about the design of physical, functional products. However, in many 
cases, descriptions of design I provide might well be about software products, service concepts, 
or business models (see Sawhney, Wolcott, & Arroniz, 2006). The psychological principles and 
constraints that underlie inventions should be shared across different domains.  
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1.3 Characteristics of Conceptual Design 
1.3.1 The role of conceptual design 
Conceptual design is commonly placed among the fuzzy front-end design activities (Khurana & 
Rosenthal, 1997; S. E. Reid & de Brentani, 2004). For instance, a textbook widely used in 
Finnish product design education by Ulrich and Eppinger (2008) describes a linear, cascading 
design process in six major phases, one of them being concept development. This generic design 
process model is shown in Figure 1.3. The name ‘generic’ implies that it is an idealization of 
realistic processes and in reality, concept development may not be so linear process nor without 
variations. However, for the present work, this general model provides a framework to which 
empirical studies of idea generation can be related to. This point of attachment is the concept 
generation step in the concept development phase.  
 
Figure 1.3 Generic prescriptive model of product development process  
highlighting the concept generation phase. Adapted from Ulrich and Eppinger (2008). 
The Ulrich and Eppinger model is of course not the only model for the design process. For 
instance the German organization Verein Deutscher Ingenieure (VDI) has specified its own 
reference model VDI 2221 for product design (Wallace, 1993). VDI 2221 is a prime example of 
a prescriptive design model, intended to instruct designers. For more prescriptive models, see 
Cross (2008). From another point of view, Keinonen and Takala (2006) have analyzed the 
position of conceptual design from the perspective of a major design organization (a ‘big 
business’ view). They argue that there exist three types of conceptual designs: vision, emerging, 
and product development concepts. This considerably broadens the scope of what conceptual 
design is about. These three concept types have different outcomes and are differently important 
for the companies. 
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 Vision concepts are strategic tools which allow companies to forecast and plan for the future. 
This can involve probing new business areas and new kinds of products. These concepts are 
typical for car and consumer electronics industry who frequently display prototypes at 
exhibitions and similar public relations events. These prototypes are hardly even considered 
eligible for production, but are used to shape the company brand through publicity. Emerging 
concepts come closer to real products. Their function is to open up channels to meet new user 
segments, new user needs, or to reform existing product platforms. Emerging concepts have 
important business value and contain features that can be integrated into existing products or 
shaped into new products swiftly. Product development (PD) concepts correspond to the 
definition of concept used earlier by Ulrich & Eppinger. PD concepts are created in order to 
define the future product. The aim is to select and refine generated concept ideas into finalized 
products. When PD concept design begins, it is already known what sort of product is being 
sought, in terms of how it should fit among the existing product catalogue of the company. 
(Keinonen & Takala, 2006) 
Finally, a common term that is mentioned sometimes in literature in relation to conceptual 
design is divergent thinking. Divergence refers to spreading or branching, to a process that 
opens up many new directions. In product design, this is what should happen during concept 
development. The term divergent is commonly associated with so called ‘creative’ thinking 
(Guilford, 1950) and can be used synonymously with ‘creative design’. Some people have also 
equated divergent thinking with simple associative thinking (Saariluoma, Nevala, & Karvinen, 
2006). If we maintain the original definition of opening (divergence) and closing (convergence) 
opportunities, it is not evident that this happens only in conceptual design. Due to many 
possibilities of misinterpretation I will avoid using the concepts divergent and convergent 
design in this text. 
1.3.2 Methods of conceptual design 
Methods are procedures or instructions that should help a person to accomplish some task. In 
contemporary literature, there are also methods associated with conceptual design. These 
methods might also be called innovation methods as their aim is to facilitate the production of 
competitive products. From a basic research point-of-view, they might be labeled as tools for 
creative, lateral (De Bono, 1970), bisociative (Koestler, 1964), divergent (Guilford, 1950), 
chaotic (Finke, 1996), impossibilistic (Boden, 1999), or out-of-the-box thinking. Due to the 
nature of conceptual design, these methods do not guarantee any solutions, they only help and 
facilitate the discovery of ideas. 
Next I will introduce some idea generation methods for conceptual design. They seem to have 
some influence on real IG practices (Berkun, 2007; Perttula, Poskela, Ekman, Sipilä, & 
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 Kuitunen, 2005), hold a position in text books, and have directed design IG research. For these 
reasons I see important to include them here. The methods come from two design traditions, 
product design (PD) and interaction design. The methods mainly serve the IG generation 
function, even though many methods go beyond that. These methods from have been selected 
by relevance and prominence in the textbooks (Pahl et al., 2007; Ulrich & Eppinger, 2008). A 
wide coverage of idea generation methods in general is not feasible, as the review by Smith 
conducted in 1998 (G. F. Smith, 1998) already identified 172 methods and more have been 
introduced since then. Shah (1998) analyzed IG methods commonly involved in engineering 
design, creating a taxonomy shown in Figure 1.4. This classification starts from a division into 
intuitive and logical models, including over a dozen different techniques. The methods I will 
discuss and reviews in thesis are all intuitive. Although the rationale of the classification may be 
disputable and I will apply a slightly different scheme later on, it nicely illustrates the variety of 
approaches. 
Engineering 
IG methods
Logical Intuitive
Axiomatic 
principles
Factorization &
systematic
combination
Inversion &
Forward steps
TRIZ
Design catalogues
Group level Individual andgroup level
Morphological analysis
Checklisting
Action -verbs
Brainstorming & 
variants
Progressive methods
Combinatorial methods
Method 6-3-5
Gallery method
C-Sketch
Storyboarding
Affinity methods
Synectics
 
Figure 1.4 Classification of IG methods for according to Shah 
(modified from Figure 1 of 1998). 
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 Product design idea generation methods. 
Brainstorming (Osborn, 1957) is inevitably the best-known method for creative group work and 
has been also adopted by the product design community. Brainstorming describes how a group 
of people should collaborate in order to increase their productivity. Invented in 1930’s, the 
original concept of Brainstorming included several normative guidelines as how an effective 
idea generation session should be conducted. However, Brainstorming has also become a 
rainbow concept which covers almost all forms of small-group practices oriented towards 
producing something new. The popularity of Brainstorming has evoked considerable attention 
from researchers. In social psychology, a selection of cumulative studies dealing with 
Brainstorming exists and is sometimes referred to as the Brainstorming literature (Sutton & 
Hargadon, 1996). The main findings of these studies were summarized in 1987 by Diehl and 
Stroebe (see Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Stroebe, Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1992) who claimed that 
the organization of group work commonly applied in Brainstorming was actually decreasing 
group creativity and productivity. Since then, identifying the problems associated with the 
traditional Brainstorming has fueled the development of many variants that usually utilize 
computer software. These variations have proven effectiveness (see e.g. Dennis, Aronson, 
Heninger, & Walker, 1999; Paulus, Nakui, Putman, & Brown, 2006; Potter & Balthazard, 
2004), but have gained only little popularity. 
The next example of intuitive methods associated with product design is Method 6-3-5 (Pahl et 
al., 2007; Rohrbach, 1969 in Pahl and Beitz, 2007). Its name refers to a procedure in which 6 
participants are initially given 5 minutes to produce 5 ideas. Ideas are written on papers that 
then are circulated between the participants. They provide inspiration and starting points for the 
following five minute rounds. This aims to support systematic exploration of all initial ideas. 
Synectics is a method introduced by Gordon (1961) that uses the idea of connecting familiar 
with unfamiliar things in order to stimulate idea generation. This idea is known as analogical or 
metaphorical thinking and would be psychologically described as the capacity of transferring 
knowledge across domains, e.g. matching a mobile navigator design to cook book recipes. 
Morphological analysis comes somewhere in the middle of intuitive and logical methods. 
Created by Zwicky (1969), it is intended to assist in exploring the problem dimension (problem 
space) by listing of the relevant attributes or parameters. After the problem dimensions are 
decomposed, the emerging matrix is filled with potential solutions, creating forced associations 
that may yield some new insights about the problem see (for more information, see Cross, 2008; 
Ritchey, 2002).  
Idea generation tools are artifacts or practices that can help in IG. Sketching is a fundamental 
design activity (Goel, 1995; Suwa, Gero, & Purcell, 1998). In design cognition research it has 
been mainly considered as an external memory (see Newell and Simon, 1972), but it is argued 
that sketching can qualitatively change the nature of design IG (see Fallman, 2003). In some 
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 areas of design, including architecture and industrial design, the final output of the work is 
represented in graphical form, nowadays commonly finalized in computer-aided design (CAD) 
environments. In the conceptual design phase, sketching and quick illustration can be an 
intermediate material to save time and provide a more detailed documentation medium than text 
alone (McKoy, Vargas Hernández, Summers, & Shah, 2001; Song & Agogino, 2004). Due to 
the essential role of sketching, there is an extensive literature about sketching that considers 
both its pragmatic, cognitive, and creative aspects (Goldschmidt, 1991; Kavakli, Scrivener, & 
Ball, 1998; Shah, Vargas Hernandez, Summers, & Kulkarni, 2001; van der Lugt, 2002).  
Prototyping is a definitely designerly way of working in PD. Prototyping can provide 
information for the design process during many parts of the process, including conceptual 
design (Pahl et al., 2007). As Ulrich and Eppinger (2008) point out the word prototype has 
various meanings and refers to both action (to prototype) and an object (the prototype). They 
also discuss different functions that prototypes have. Using two dimensions, called physicality 
and comprehensiveness, they present three feasible clusters of prototypes. Comprehensive 
physical prototypes are examples of extensive pieces that can be used for communication (from 
design team to outside), integration (between design teams), learning (within design team), and 
as milestones (an acid test). For instance, previously mentioned vision concepts in car industry 
are prototypes in this sense (cf. Keinonen & Takala, 2006). Focused physical prototypes are for 
communication and learning whereas focused analytical prototypes are for learning purposes 
(‘design exploration’). They usually target some parts of the concept and may include some 
physical approximation of the future product.  
The practice of focused physical prototyping used for learning is beautifully reflected in two 
volumes by Kelley (Kelley & Littman, 2001, 2005). These books describe product development 
success stories that originate from prototype-based conceptual design. As building full-blown 
prototypes is time consuming and expensive, concept designers commonly seek out ways to do 
rapid or rough prototyping which is faster and coarse, but still effective (Reinikainen & 
Björklund, 2008; Sanders & Dandavate, 1999). The idea of rough prototyping is to try out 
design ideas as early as possible and learn from the outcomes. It tends to produce focused 
physical prototypes, as the comprehensiveness is limited by the readily available components. 
Notice that the term rapid prototyping is also used outside conceptual design in relation to 
embodiment design (e.g. see Kochan, Kai, & Zhaohui, 1999).  
Physical prototyping requires some flexible material for building prototypes. This has lead 
designers to develop specific prototyping kits, such as make-tools (see Mattelmäki & Battarbee, 
2002; Sanders & Dandavate, 1999), which allow quickly building approximate models of a 
concept. They can still serve as a starting point for discussion and reflection about the designed 
artifact. ‘Physical’ prototyping is not limited to physical products. The term Bodystorming has 
been introduced to describe prototyping applied to designing user experiences, particularly in 
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 relation to different services (Buchenau & Suri, 2000). Incidentally the same term has been also 
used in another sense related to interaction design (Oulasvirta, Kurvinen, & Kankainen, 2003) to 
describe an IG practice resembling brainstorming but simulating or taking place in some real 
world context.  
Existing and competing product examples are sometimes introduced to the IG process not only 
for benchmarking, but for inspiration. Different kind of stimuli in a design IG process have been 
quite extensively investigated (Benami & Jin, 2002; Perttula & Sipilä, 2007; Shah, Kulkarni, & 
Vargas Hernandez, 2000). Commonly practiced benchmarking could also be said to achieve this 
purpose. Several investigators have studied how related products and unrelated stimuli included 
in design IG sessions can influence the design process. More directly applicable solution can be 
provided by reversed biomimicry. This means studying and evaluating biological forms and 
functions, for instance, bird flight, in order to use this as an inspiration for design (Benyus, 
2002; Volstad & Boks, 2008). 
Interaction design idea generation methods. 
Interaction design refers to the design of interactive products and interfaces. These are 
commonly associated with computer software products, but nowadays more and more found in 
many physical products and embedded systems. The selection of methods presented in the field 
of interaction design is impressive given its relatively short history. For instance, prototype-
based iterative testing and development has been a prevalent method already for some time in 
interaction design, whereas it is a relatively new idea for conceptual PD. In interaction design, 
there exists a culture of visual software concept demonstrators, non-interactive communication 
tools (Wolf, Rode, Sussman, & Kellogg, 2006). On surface level they correspond to visionary 
concepts of automotive industry, but they are not functional. Within interaction design, user-
centered design (UCD, e.g. in ISO, 1999) or design for user experience (DUX; Hassenzahl & 
Tractinsky, 2006) are currently important design approaches. It has been argued that a transition 
from technology-centered to human-centered development of products is a fundamental 
paradigm shift for product design as well (Krippendorff, 2006). However, in the context of the 
present thesis UCD or DUX are not particularly interesting. The reason is that the user-
grounded requirements of usability or acceptability are in the present theory considered to be 
equal to all other design constraints, for example technological ones.  
The user-related requirements have an indirect influence on design IG. This is because even 
discovering user constraints has proven to be a challenge. For instance, in software design, 
technological development has not been as important as acknowledging the need for some 
product or service (e.g. the rise of social media and Facebook). In order to handle the user 
needs, several techniques that provide user-needs input for design IG have been introduced. The 
interesting methods belong to a cluster called user-inspired design (UID, concept is derived 
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 from Mattelmäki & Keinonen, 2001). These types of methodologies produce information, or 
inspirational material, that can be exploited in the IG phase of conceptual design. These 
methods overlap the combinatorial methods branch of the intuitive group methods presented by 
Shah (1998) in Figure 2.1. 
Although UID is not a clearly defined field, in my opinion there are some published methods 
that fit this function. From a set of inspirational methods, probes, extreme-user method, and 
video-based methods are considered. Cultural or empathy probes are a method for learning 
about how a segment of users lives, how they perceive their daily life, and possibly how they 
use existing technologies (Gaver et al., 1999; see also Mattelmäki & Battarbee, 2002). 
Physically, probes are a collection of simple artifacts, such as notebook, map, and a disposable 
camera. This set of items allows users to record facts and happenings of their daily life 
independently. Technology probes are a separate technique that some novel technology to the 
package (Hutchinson et al., 2003). Designers prepare the probes, deliver them to users, and 
collect them. The method is essentially inspirational because there is no formal method to 
analyze this input. Instead, the probes are used as stimuli for designers to help provoking ideas 
that may relate closely or remotely to the probed users. 
Extreme-user method also tries to ground conceptual design in the lives of users (Holmquist, 
2004, 2006). In this method, a group of people are selected because of their special interests, 
hobbies, or conditions. The practices of this group, called extreme users, are investigated using 
some qualitative method (see subsection 2.2.4). The goal is to analyze their common interests or 
practices. For instance, people practicing lomophotography or having reptilians as pets have 
been studied (Jacobsson, Ljungblad, Bodin, Knurek, & Holmquist, 2007; Ljungblad, 
Hakansson, Gaye, & Holmquist, 2004). The responsibility over the design remains with the 
professional designers, as this approach does not require users to participate in design or to 
generate design themselves, unlike different participatory design (Kensing & Blomberg, 1998) 
or lead-user design (Hippel, 1977; Urban & von Hippel, 1988) would require. 
Video is a medium that is all the time getting more and more attention in interaction design. 
Video can serve multiple functions in a design process. As a way of user-needs and task 
analysis, video-based ethnography records and communicates the users’ life to the designers. In 
participatory design, video is often used to record the design sessions and arising ideas. The 
power of video communication is leveraged in usability studies, which can employ video to 
highlight a usability problem. And the video has also the capability to communicate concepts 
and ideas that are otherwise just fiction, as highlighted earlier when discussing video 
demonstrators as visionary concepts. Demonstrator videos in scenario-based design can depict 
futuristic interaction sessions taking place with a concept product or a service (Ylirisku & Buur, 
2007). In particular the ethnography function leads the way to idea generation and provides 
inspiration for design.  
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 1.4 Background for Design Cognition 
1.4.1 Cognitive theories 
I claim that the theory presented in this thesis is ‘cognitive’. This should be complemented by 
saying that approach is symbolic cognition, or traditional computationalism as defined by 
Newell (1980) For those unfamiliar with this discourse, it need to be said that cognitive theories 
can address very different levels of information processing and there is no clear consensus of 
what these levels are or what do they stand for. For instance, Anderson (1990) reviewed slightly 
different proposals for the types of cognitive theory from six different authors, including 
himself. To illustrate the opportunities for a cognitive design theory, I have chosen some of the 
descriptions mentioned by Anderson (ibid.) and summarized them in Table 1.2 below: 
Table 1.2 Levels of cognitive theory according to various cognitive scientists adaptod to 
design context. Adapted from Anderson (1990) with modifications. 
Chomsky, 1957 Pylyshyn, 1984 Anderson, 1990 Description “design example” 
Performance: What happens in design, phenomena of design 
“Ed is working with a pen and paper” 
Semantic Rational/ 
Adaptive 
Abstract descriptions of design, 
“Ed is sketching a paper machine” 
Algorithm Algorithm Computational description of how 
design is carried out 
“How Ed re-uses his existing 
knowledge and skills to create the 
design” 
Inferred from a protocol 
Competence: 
Description of 
how design is 
possible 
Functional 
architecture 
Implementation Computational implementation of 
the theory 
“How information about paper 
machines and operations required 
for design reside in cognition” 
 Biological Biological Foundations of design in human 
biology 
“How brain, hand muscles, and 
other body parts operate to produce 
the design” 
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 Anderson includes four different levels of cognitive theory: rational, algorithm, implementation, 
and biological levels. These fairly well aligned with other prominent cognitive scientists, named 
in the previous table.  
The theory of design I defend here is an algorithm level description of cognition, corresponding 
to the approach presented in the constituent publications I-III and VII. It is assumed that this is 
the level from which some results of operating algorithms are available for conscious reporting 
and cognitive scientists can acquire this information by protocol analysis (see section 2.2.3). 
One could also describe my theory as heuristic in contrast to detailed as I will remain on a fairly 
abstract level and not present more precise mathematical or algorithmic formulation than what 
has been used in the publications. I attempt to construct through examples and logic a theory of 
idea generation that has determined limits. In several occasions, this thesis includes references 
to the performance and rational levels, but the main interest remains at the algorithm level. The 
implementation and biological levels are not considered.  
The biological level does not appear relevant for the purposes of this study, although there are 
some related studies that investigate the relation of creative work and brain activity (Chávez-
Eakle, Graff-Guerrero, García-Reyna, Vaugier, & Cruz-Fuentes, 2007; Howard-Jones, 
Blakemore, Samuel, Summers, & Claxton, 2005). This resembles Anderson’s (1990, p. 26) 
belief that “for many purposes … such a physiological base would be excess baggage.” The 
functional architecture, or implementation, is important and will be necessary step in the future 
to evaluate the algorithm level theory. It should be noted that a mathematical model (applying 
set theory) for creative design has been proposed recently proposed (Hatchuel & Weil, 2009), 
but it does not fit the desired psychological modeling scheme at all. 
1.4.2 Concepts of design cognition 
Scientific enterprises are usually characterized by the concepts and theories used to describe 
their research subject. In natural sciences, these concepts and theories are commonly expressed 
as mathematical formulas, theorems, or computer models. Some consider this mathematical 
approach as the hallmark of science, or at least as a demarcation criterion for ‘hard’ science. 
However, the history of science shows that even the so called laws of nature formulated in exact 
formulas may prove wrong. For instance, Newtonian physics have been somewhat replaced by 
quantum physics for increased accuracy but at the cost of additional complexity. In some aspect 
the old Newtonian theory is better because is easier to apply and understand. And in order to be 
useful, the formulas need to be understood and easily applicable.  
Concepts and theories of design cognition advocated here belong to the ‘soft sciences’ category. 
In this thesis, no proofs or equations of idea generation will be presented. Instead, design will be 
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 described by concepts that attempt to help in understanding the process of design from a 
psychological perspective. This may lead to more formal approaches in the future. Along with 
the previous comparison of Newtonian and quantum physics, I claim that from the present 
perspective, this kind of theory is good in the current circumstances, even if it is not an ultimate 
one. 
My next step is to introduce the vocabulary that I will use in this work to describe conceptual 
design with. The concepts are mainly derived from the vocabularies of traditional cognitive 
science and problem solving. I do not claim that they are all necessary or even adequate for 
describing issues of interest, but they are necessary to explicate how the design-as-problem-
solving view has evolved. The main concepts new to IG research start from page 36 and 
concern the role of memory in IG.  
It must be noted that only a fraction of all concepts central to cognitive psychology can be 
considered here. General psychology covers topics from visual perception, attention, speech 
perception and production to emotions and decision making (see e.g. Eysenck & Keane, 2000; 
Quinland & Dyson, 2008). I have chosen to focus on the concepts that are most suitable for 
describing design IG and which have been used in the constituent publications. The excluded 
topics are considered to be less relevant for the present theory. Expertise presents one boundary 
case that bears significance and has traditions in design studies. I have chosen to omit it here, 
although I make some references to it. For those unfamiliar with the topic, I recommend become 
acquainted with the literature (see e.g. Ball, Evans, Dennis, & Ormerod, 1997; Casakin & 
Goldschmidt, 1999; Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988; Cross, 2004b; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Popovic, 
2004). 
The explanatory concepts used in design cognition are derived from a dichotomy of processing 
and knowledge. This distinction is derived from the computer metaphor (Newell, 1980), an early 
model of human cognition inspired by digital computer and the Turing machine. According to 
this view, all information processing can be divided between two theoretical entities; data 
structures and operations on data structures. The information processor, for example a 
computer, a Turing machine, or a human, is constantly processing information according to 
some procedure, algorithm. For instance, if numbers 1 and 2 are the data and an operation ‘sum 
up’ is defined, new datum, number three, can be produced by procedure sum up(1,2). 
When this thinking is applied to design cognition, it becomes necessary to find a framework for 
describing the design activity as a whole, depict the steps in this activity, and present a theory of 
design knowledge. Design activity has been repeatedly described as ill-structured problem 
solving in cognitive literature (Newell, 1969; Newell & Simon, 1972; Reitman, 1965; see 
Visser, 2009), inspired by the progress that had been made on the so called well-defined 
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problems. Later on, these principles have been applied to ill-structured problems and thus it is 
necessary to introduce them here, although they may at first seem quite detached from design. 
The concept of problem solving is fundamental for cognitive psychology and the early forms of 
artificial intelligence. The idea is that a problem consists of an initial state and a goal state. The 
problem exists if the stages differ and the transition from the initial state is non-trivial. The final 
part of the problem description is the selection of operations that are required to reach the goal 
state from the initial state. In this formalism, problem solving is a process of moving from the 
initial to the goal state by applying selected operations. 
A simple example to illustrate well-structured problem solving commonly used in the literature 
is a game. In the Tower of Hanoi, three discs of increasing size are placed on one of three pegs 
and must be moved from the left peg to the right peg so that only one piece is moved at a time 
and a larger piece can never be placed upon a smaller one. If you attempt to solve this task 
mentally you will probably find it very difficult if not impossible. However, with help of 
physical objects or a sketch, such as that displayed in Figure 1.5 below it is much easier to see 
how the solution can be attained. 
 
Figure 1.5. Visualization of a problem states for the Tower of Hanoi game. The initial state 
is in the bottom left of the pyramid, the goal state on the top. 
The problem visualization in Figure 1.5 shows that because the goal state can not be reached by 
one operation, many intermediate states emerge. Problem space is the combination of all 
possible problem states, including the initial, intermediate, and goal states. Problem solving is 
about moving or making steps in the space towards the goal state. Tower of Hanoi also 
Goal state 
Initial 
state 
 illustrates the challenge in solving the well-defined problem. The problem is not about knowing 
how to do, as the operation is clearly defined, but in selecting the right operation in each turn. 
This is the problem of search associated with well-defined problems.  
Search is an essential concept to describe problem solving. It describes how to navigate through 
the problem space and find the goal. Literature describes several ways how the search can be 
guided, how the operators are selected. It is assumed that there must be a feedback mechanism, 
a way to evaluate the progress. This is the distance to the goal as a consequence of applying a 
problem solving operation. Methods such as means-end analysis, hill climbing, forward or 
backward search, or heuristic search (Langley, 1985; Newell & Simon, 1972; Russell & Norvig, 
2003; Simon & Newell, 1958) all describe different ways of guiding the search. Many of these 
algorithms have exact algorithmic formulations documented in literature and are excluded here. 
A characteristic feature of well-defined problems is that the minimal amount of operations 
required to reach the goal can be calculated, e.g. following the right side of the pyramid in the 
example. This is the optimal solution for this problem. The performance of different search 
methods can be examined by comparing how close to optimal solutions they produce. From the 
perspective of artificial intelligence, the search methods fall into three different categories: 
uninformed, heuristic, and fully informed. Uninformed search is commonly labeled as ‘brute 
force’ method because it does not require knowledge, only a feedback mechanism to operate. In 
the Tower of Hanoi example, this would mean that all paths to the goal state are randomly tried 
until the difference to the goal is minimized to zero. This technique is considered to be a strong 
method because it is guaranteed to produce a solution.  
Heuristic search relies on so called heuristic knowledge, commonly called ‘rules of thumb’ in 
deciding the next move. Heuristics are learnt rules that have a limited application. For instance, 
assume another game called the Tower of Pisa. Players of this game may have learnt a heuristic 
“always move the small peg to the extreme right” and try apply that rule to Tower of Hanoi. The 
heuristics can produce solutions more efficiently than uninformed search, but it can go 
completely wrong if the rules do not fit the problem domain. This is what happens with the 
Tower of Pisa heuristic above. This means that heuristics are weak methods, prone to err, in 
problem solving. Finally, there are fully informed methods that come closest to the traditional 
sense of knowing something. For instance, the set of procedures needed to solve Tower of 
Hanoi can be remembered and looked up from memory to quickly solve the problem. This 
search method is very vulnerable to changes, like the Tower of Pisa heuristic; knowledge may 
become outdated or obsolete if the problem space is changed but a little.  
One evident point of criticism is that hardly any of real life problems are as simple as the 
previous example. More complex problems require more elaborate definitions of the initial and 
goals state, and more operations for completing the task. Some might say that they require 
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 knowledge more than search mechanisms. A very important part of any cognitive theory is a 
description of knowledge. In the Tower of Hanoi example, the problem has been represented 
and solved using a fairly limited number of components, three discs and pegs, and one rule. This 
is not much of a knowledge structure or a computational system. In cognitive sciences, concepts 
such as schemata and frames have been usually applied to describe more elaborative and 
structured combinations of knowledge (see, e.g. Eysenck & Keane, 2000; Russell & Norvig, 
2003). For design, the psychological representation of design knowledge is necessary part of the 
theory but currently not very well understood. This is discussed in 3.1.3. 
Another important addition of ill-structured problem solving theories is the introduction of 
multiple, independent ‘problem’ spaces. For instance, Klahr and Dunbar (1988; see also Klahr 
& Simon, 1999) have used concepts of a separate problem and solution space to describe how 
scientific discovery, or rule induction from empirical data, unfolds in an experimental setting. 
While design maybe is a more solution-oriented area than scientific inquiry (see Goel & Pirolli, 
1992), Dorst and Cross (2001) have discussed the opportunities of a dual space search in design. 
They describe co-evolution of solution and problem space which takes occurs in the process. An 
important component in their model is constant search for surprises that could bridge the two 
spaces at some point of time. 
This thesis attempts to extend the design cognition theory and hence it is necessary to introduce 
relevant new explanatory concepts. In this work, the concepts are psychological ones describing 
properties of human memory (for more information, see e.g. Baddeley, Eysenck, & Anderson, 
2009; Quinland & Dyson, 2008). The story starts from the computer metaphor and from the 
concepts of short-term or working memory (WM), and long-term memory (LTM). The analogy 
to a 21st century PC would associate working memory with the random-access memory (RAM) 
and long-term memory with the hard drive. However, beyond these simplified functional roles, 
there is very little resemblance between human and computer memory. External memory (EM) 
concept is also sometimes used (Newell & Simon, 1972) to highlight how people external aids, 
such as Post-it notes and shopping lists, to overcome the limitations of WM and LTM. It must 
be stated that in this thesis, and in related theories of IG reviewed in section 2.4, it is assumed 
that even complex memory contents can be retrieved as quite perfect records of memory. This is 
somewhat problematic assumption is considered in Discussion (4.4). 
Discussing the construct of human memory, we encounter several opinions about the nature of 
that system. First, the distinction between short and long-term memory is not a very clear one 
and psychologists still argue over the matter. While some have proposed very elaborate theories 
about the nature of WM, including an organization which divides it into four subsystems 
(Baddeley, 2000), even the existence of a short-term memory as a cognitive mechanism remains 
somewhat disputed (see e.g. Cowan, 2001; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). The debate boils down to 
the question can WM be considered as an independent storage system or is it a temporarily 
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 activated part of LTM. As this thesis is about applying memory concepts, it seems appropriate 
just to describe the functional properties that these two types of memory (WM and LTM) have, 
rather than dive into the theoretical debates about their nature.  
WM is a system that can hold small amount of information for a short period of time. The label 
working memory is figurative, for it is important to be able to briefly retain some information 
available in mind, such as a new phone number when placing a call. The contents of the WM 
are typically eventually stored in and later retrieved from LTM, sometimes called permanent 
memory, which has a seemingly infinite capacity to store information. It is likely the primary 
storage of your own phone number. Despite the huge capacity of LTM, people often have 
problems remembering things. These can be attributed to two sources: either something has not 
been learned (does not exist in LTM) or it can not be accessed (retrieved from LTM). In contrast 
to computers, human memory works very differently, because it has adapted to solve very 
different kind of data storage problems than what a computer has been designed to (Anderson, 
1990). For this reason, phone catalogues, and more recently Internet, can serve as external 
memory that can help to overcome these limitations. 
The information contained in LTM must become available in WM before it can be utilized. This 
access is called search. The LTM search is guided by a set of search cues, for instance, 
Unsworth and Engle (2007) mention temporal, contextual, categorical cues. These cues are used 
to form a search set and this set is sampled for retrieving items (illustrated in Figure 1.6 below). 
To get the desired information into the search set for recovery, the initial search cues must 
include several attributes that are associated with the desired information. An important feature 
of human memory is flexibility, which shows in probabilistic retrieval and variable content 
addressing. While this can be a defect, as in the case of forgetting, it also offers good 
performance in a variety of situations in which computers can not operate very well in. 
 
 
Set of cues 
designated to 
delimit search 
set 
 X = relevant memories (search target) 
O = irrelevant memories (non-targets) 
Search set 
O  X  
X  O  X  O 
X  O  O  X  X 
X  O  O  X 
X  X  O 
 
 
Recovery 
 
X  X 
 
Decision and 
Response 
 
X 
Figure 1.6. Memory retrieval process according to Unsworth and Engle (2007). Recovery 
from LTM is based on a sampling from a search set. The search set is delimited by a 
mandatory set of memory search cues. Targets and non-targets illustrate the challenge of 
recovering only task-relevant memories.  
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 Another important question concerns the limitations of WM. It is said to be restricted in 
capacity but just how large is our working memory capacity (WMC) or how should be 
measured? After fifty years of study, the nature and size of WMC is still a debated issue in 
psychology (see, for instance, Feldman Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Miller, 1956; Unsworth 
& Engle, 2007). WMC is typically measured in chunks. The fine feature of chunk is that it is not 
fixed to any particular type of information. For instance, place your finger on this page, mind 
the letters U, E, O, I, N, M, R, N, D, F, and close the page for ten seconds. Open the page again 
and try how many letters you can recall correctly. 
The capacity debate goes back over 50 years (Miller, 1956) to the first approximations 
suggesting that WM can hold 7±2 chunks at a time. Modern estimates about WMC are modest 
and assume that you should remember at least 4 letters (Cowan, 2001). Remembering all 11 
unrelated units of information clearly exceeds the capacity of working memory and hence they 
cannot be recalled correctly when they are prompted for. However, if you had tried to recall the 
word ‘uninformed’, a different kind of chunk composed of the same letters, the task would have 
been trivial. This means that the organization of knowledge can influence the outcome of our 
cognitive efforts. It has been demonstrated that WMC limitations can be overridden using a 
mechanism called chunking, which is commonly related to expertise in a certain domain 
(Ericsson & Smith, 1991) and recent proposals about a long-term working memory (Ericsson & 
Kintsch, 1995) take this into consideration. Nevertheless, WMC is limited and this limitation 
affects much of human information processing, also design (Bilda & Gero, 2005, 2007). In this 
thesis I will concentrate on memory search as a major influence for idea generation. 
1.4.3 Idea generation in design cognition 
Idea generation as a separate theoretical topic has not been particularly popular in design 
cognition research or in cognitive psychology. The state-of-the-art studies have addressed 
pragmatic aspects of design IG using experimental methodology (Shah et al., 2000; Shah, 
Smith, Vargas Hernandez, Gerkens, & Wulan, 2003; Shah, Vargas Hernandez, & Smith, 2003). 
One important observation about this development is that the ill-structured problem-solving 
view commonly used to account for design cognition does not appear to be a very fitting model 
of design IG. Instead some recent theories of IG have been inspired by the creative cognition 
approach (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992) which goes beyond the problem solving view. In this 
view, creating something new is heavily influenced by previous experiences and acquired 
knowledge. These parallels from the creativity research literature have opened up possibilities to 
investigate new topics possibly more important to the design practice than problem-solving 
studies. For instance, factors such as provocative stimuli, suspended judgment, incubation, or 
example exposure (Shah, Smith et al., 2003) would not have been very viable in the terms of the 
traditional problem-solving approach. I consider them further in the section 2.4. 
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 2 Related Research 
This chapter introduces philosophy for investigating design and presents previous design studies 
relevant for understanding design idea generation. I first introduce the principles of conducting 
empirical design research. This leads to a review of selected studies. The value of these design 
experiments is eventually evaluated by contrasting them to the theoretical models of idea 
generation. 
2.1 Background for Design Studies 
Research on design idea generation rests on theoretical assumptions about what kind of activity 
design is (see 1.1.2). The next question is what can be and currently is known about design. The 
goal of this thesis was to examine the information processes underlying design IG. However, 
these can not be directly observed, unlikely mechanical systems. The research underlying this 
dissertation has been carried under the assumption that design can be investigated as a kind of 
‘semi-transparent box’ thinking. This means that some psychological processes of design are 
available to study through behavioral indicators, but their interpretation is theory-laden and 
some important processes may have only indirect influences and are unobservable. This means 
that the designer is not just a black box between inputs and outputs, but that the mediation of 
inputs and outputs is controlled by processes and mechanisms that are partially available for 
empirical study. Figure 2.1 illustrates this idea:  
Input Output
Input
Cognition
Output
Knowledge
structures
Cognitive
operations
 
Figure 2.1 Two views of studying design thinking. On left, black box thinking ignores 
mental structures, emphasizing only the input-output function. On right, semi-transparent 
model attempts to describe the outputs as a function of cognitive operations on knowledge 
structures.  
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 The figure displays two types of thinking both relevant for describing design research attitudes. 
Semi-transparent box thinking assumes certain mental structures and attempts to identify their 
influence by studying the design output. For instance, these structures may relate to the key 
concepts of design cognition presented in 1.4.1. This semi-transparent box thinking could be 
compared to a blend of rational and situated approaches suggested by Fallman (2003; see 1.1.2). 
The black box thinking ignores these structures, emphasizing only the input-output function. 
This might correspond to an extreme pragmatic view of design, or Fallman’s idea of design 
practice. 
To further illustrate the different attitudes to the study of design, take an example of explaining 
a hypothetical situation in which certain IG method, say watching Soviet propaganda films, 
seems to lead to superior performance. Let us consider this from the different perspectives. The 
pragmatist designer Pete might embrace the black box thinking because it does not matter to 
him why and how an IG method works, if it produces excellent results. But cognitive scientist 
Simon might not be satisfied in observing that stimulated brainstorming increases the number of 
produced ideas twofold. Simon would want to know how the human cognitive processes 
produce this effect. He would seek a description of design at least as a semi-transparent theory. 
An optimistic cognitive scientist Oscar might venture further into what might be called ‘glass 
box thinking’ and assume that scientific methods can reveal all structures relevant for 
understanding the effect (cf. rational account Fallman, 2003). Oscar might be already 
collaborating with cognitive neuroscienstist Nelson who believes that brain research can take us 
to another level in understanding cognition, including such complex activities as creativity and 
design – to ‘brain-machine thinking’ (cf. Howard-Jones et al., 2005). 
These same attitudes that I have reflected here to design research context have their counterparts 
in the cognitive theories framework presented in 1.4.1. Pragmatic Pete might only be concerned 
about performance, whereas Simon would be interested about semantic and algorithm level 
explanations. Oscar would investigate design at the level of functional architecture and Nelson 
observe the biological foundations of design. For instance, can all ‘higher’ levels of theory be 
reduced to lower level, ultimately biological or material, descriptions? Or do these higher levels 
necessarily include emergent properties that can not be captured by a lower level theory because 
they do not exist on such a level? This is a matter of philosophical debate how these different 
levels relate to each other and that discussion goes back to a long era of studies in the 
philosophy of mind considering the relation of mental functions and biological organization 
(Dennett, 1987; Fodor, 1976). However, in the present context, this discussion about theoretical 
attitudes will suffice and I will only state that the majority of the related work presented here 
shares the perspective of Simon. Similarly, my interest is in the algorithm level as defined 
earlier, not indicating that the theory would be presented as an algorithm. 
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 2.2 Methods for Design Research 
Research is necessarily more than just a bunch of theoretical assumptions. The methodology 
available for the psychological study of design is nowadays considerable. Already Thomas and 
Carroll (1979) laid out a number of different approaches for investigating design. They grouped 
design study methods into expert experiments, controlled free-response experiments, and 
controlled restricted-response experiments. Beyond experiments, case studies and quasi-
experiments have emerged since that time as important new methods. For this thesis, I have 
picked out some of the most essential methods and describe them in the following paragraphs. 
For instance, ethnographic approaches to design research are omitted here. To get a broader 
picture of design, read about case studies (Yin, 2003), see Thomas and Carroll (1979), or 
explore any recent volume of Design Studies to discover the variety of research methods.  
2.2.1 Introduction to experimental research 
This subsection briefly describes the basics of experimental design research. It is intended to 
help understanding the results of the reviewed studies and work carried out for this thesis. 
Design idea generation studies (see, for instance Shah et al., 2000; Shah, Smith et al., 2003; 
Shah, Vargas Hernandez et al., 2003) are typically experimental psychological (social or 
cognitive) studies. Experimental research is conducted to determine causal relations; i.e. what 
consequence do changes in fixed factors (independent variables) have in terms of certain 
outcomes (dependent variables). This is ideally carried out in a controlled manner so that only 
certain fixed factor is changed between the conditions and the possible change in outcomes can 
thus be attributed to the change of factor. In the spirit of semi-transparent box thinking this 
cause should be explained by referring to the properties of cognition. An example setup of an 
experimental idea generation study would be to investigate how the group size (independent 
variable) affects the amount of ideas produced by one person (dependent variable).  
Real experiments often employ multiple levels of independent variables. For instance, there can 
be several group sizes in an IG experiment. Several independent variables can also coexist, so 
that in addition to group size, same and mixed-sex groups can be compared. As a result, the 
experimental setup can be described as a formula of the number of different independent levels. 
The present setup might be called as 3 x 2 design, three indicating the number of different group 
sizes and two groups compositions (same or mixed). Subjects are assigned to different 
experimental groups, so that single subject produces data about one level of independent 
variable (e.g. works only in a 4-person group). This creates a between-subjects design. 
Alternatively the participants can be included in several levels (e.g. work alone and in a group), 
which is called a within-subjects or a repeated-measures design. 
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 The results of an experiment are commonly expressed as main and interaction effects, which are 
statistically confirmed usually by some analysis of variance procedure (ANOVA, ANCOVA, 
MANOVA, etc.). If there are differences between levels of a factor, then a main effect is found. 
If some difference emerges only with a certain combination of levels, e.g. with the biggest 
group size and same sex groups, then an interaction effect is found.  
Experimental research with human participants is challenging to design and implement. 
Running experiments requires recruitment and organization of subjects. People are seldom alike 
one another or completely controllable robots. In order to acquire reliable results, the number of 
measurements must be adequate and then statistically tested. The number of independent factor 
levels in a between-subjects setup gives the number of required independent groups, each of 
which should be big enough to filter out individual differences. For instance, a proper 2 x 2 
design would required 4 groups to balance the design. When the designs get complex (such as 2 
x 2 x 2 x 2 in Shah, Smith et al., 2003), the required number of participants for a completely 
balanced design increases considerably. Complex designs can also produce interaction effects 
that can get difficult to interpret. For instance, if we add factors ‘visual stimuli’ and ‘incubation’ 
to the group size and composition, we may end up having a four-factor (four-way) interaction 
effect. This means that some combination of factor levels together produces an effect that would 
be invisible otherwise. If it often becomes difficult to explain these effects by a theory, it is 
better to use more simple design or partial factorial design, which can omit interactions. Of 
course this means somewhat rejecting the data-grounded truth. 
Although several guidelines for experimental research exist, studies on humans are much more 
difficult to control than field crop in botanical investigations. In practice, social and 
psychological experiments are somewhat compromised and might be more accurately described 
as quasi-experimental research (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). This refers to the fact that 
the assignment of individuals to groups may not be truly random and variables that cannot be 
controlled affect data collection.  
2.2.2 Characteristics of idea generation studies 
Idea generation experiments have some special features. In practice, experimental research on 
design IG requires limiting the freedom of designers. In IG studies participants need to follow 
quite strict orders and adapt working styles that they might not otherwise follow. The fact that 
only a few factors are manipulated at a time to single out other influences necessarily decreases 
the similarity of real and experiment-sparked IG. The experimental control is necessary for 
research but problematic for ecological validity. Thus I tend think that the studies introduced in 
and conducted for this thesis as psychological experiments that address design-related 
questions, rather than vice versa. 
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 Second, design studies always require designers. In psychology, subjects have been traditionally 
selected by convenience. The majority of published design studies compare groups of students. 
This has also been the approach in the constituent studies underlying this dissertation. This is 
problematic to some extent, as there are known effects of gaining skills and knowledge, 
expertise in design. (Cross, 2004b; Lawson & Dorst, 2005; McDonnell, Lloyd, & Valkenburg, 
2004). However for IG research, the uniform education and lack of ‘real’ experience might be 
beneficial (see discussion in Publication II), as it hypothesized to reduce variation in IG results.  
For IG studies, it is notable whether people actually work in isolation or as an interactive group. 
In Brainstorming literature, the concept of nominal groups has been used to refer to comparison 
(control) group who work alone, but whose efforts are pooled to create a reference score so that 
the relative merit of group work can be assessed. It is notable that the group as an information-
processing unit (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008) may behave differently than an 
individual. This is why the majority of evidence in this thesis has been collected from studies 
which involve analyses at the individual level. 
Design IG studies are organized to assess hypotheses operationalized into independent factors. 
The influence of these factors requires indicators, dependent variables. The most common 
variable is the number of ideas (sketches, etc.) produced and is labeled quantity, productivity, or 
just number. Typically only unique, non-repetitive ideas are counted. This simple figure is often 
complemented by some measure of creativity even though creativity is difficult to define 
(Mayer, 1999) and to measure. Typically researchers consider either novelty or quality of the 
idea. Novelty, diversity, or commonality can be operationalized in several ways, but is generally 
supposed to index how common the idea is. Quality can be addressed as functionality, 
feasibility, or even usability (Shah, Vargas Hernandez et al., 2003). 
2.2.3 Protocol analysis and case studies 
Design protocol analysis is an important stream of design cognition research. It is 
complementary to the experimental research in attempting to investigate directly cognitive 
processes involved in design thinking, instead of revealing causal relations between variables. 
Protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) is commonly known by the name ‘think-aloud’ 
method (van Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 1994). It is founded on the assumption that people 
can reveal some parts of their cognitive processes by constantly talking aloud while performing 
the task of interest. In particular, protocol analysis is assumed to reflect the content held active 
in working memory. Traditionally, protocols have been purely verbal, but the technological 
advances in the past two decades have made it possible to acquire and transcribe video protocols 
as well (e.g. in Akin & Lin, 1995). However, these should be distinguished from video-based 
design methods which have different goals. 
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 Talking while thinking is not natural for most of the people, but subjects can usually adopt this 
way of working provided some practice. Typically subjects receive a simple warm-up task, for 
instance a puzzle, to get started with the method. Once the subjects become comfortable with 
talking while working, the protocol for the real task can be recorded. The experimenter may 
need to prompt the subjects to keep talking, if they start to hesitate during the brief. After the 
researcher has acquired the protocols, they are transcribed in verbatim. Transcriptions are 
divided into segments, which may correspond to individual utterances or phrases.  
The protocol analysis is intended to be a theory-driven method. The segments of the protocol 
need to be coded, or categorized, using a theoretical framework. This framework determines 
what we can find out from the protocols. Multiple, parallel coding schemes can be used if this is 
justified by the theoretical approach. Take an example, a design protocol of an architect 
designing a modern villa from a scratch. It might be coded from two perspectives: sources of 
information consulted and cognitive operations. The former might be easy to categorize into 
memory, sketches, and catalogues, but the latter clearly requires a theory of what the cognitive 
operations might be (as an example see Gero & McNeill, 1998). Categorization of the segments 
is thus crucial to the quality of data and as it is heavily coder dependent, it is a common 
procedure to use several coders who independently apply the same coding scheme. The 
agreement of multiple observers is then determined using some statistical method to achieve a 
measure of inter-rater reliability. 
The result of protocol analysis is a sequence of actions found in the protocol. This should reveal 
patterns in the application of different cognitive operations. The cognitive scientist can then 
proceed to evaluate how well these patterns match the predictions of the theory. Protocol 
analysis can also be applied in a data-driven manner, in which the data are used to develop a 
coding scheme and a cognitive theory of the target activity as well. This is probably a more 
common approach in design research which has no solid models of cognitive activity to map 
design activities to (Publication II, but see also Vargas Hernandez, Shah, & Smith, 2007). 
Protocol analyses are often carried out in a setting that is not experimental, but closer to a case 
study due to a small number of subjects rendering it impossible to generalize the results. The 
main reason is that the protocol method is quite labor intensive for the researcher. For example, 
Ahmed, Wallace, and Blessing (2003) report that the transcription and coding of a protocol took 
25 times the recording time. Case-study approach is also supported by the fact that explorative 
work can proceed with smaller samples than hypothesis-driven (e.g. Ho, 2001). 
Other kinds of case studies (Yin, 2003) also hold an important place in design studies. Case 
studies do not refer to the application of a certain method, but to a type of inquiry in which 
observations from a limited number of observations are analyzed, usually qualitatively and over 
an extended period of time, to a considerable detail. The strength of case studies is ecological 
validity, as they are usually the only method that can be applied in natural environments. For 
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 instance, professional architects may be impossible to study in large numbers, particularly in a 
laboratory environment. Thus the only way to learn from their working is to study a selected 
few in their real environment as case studies. Their shortcoming is that they lack the power of 
causal explanation.  
2.2.4 Qualitative methods 
Qualitative methods can also produce information about IG and design creativity, but on a 
different level. They are also tools normally used in case studies. For an experimental 
researcher, they have a supporting role. Instead of addressing factors that influence design 
thinking they attempt to provide an understanding of design and explore the present state of 
thinking (e.g. as in Publication V). These methods originate from social sciences and include 
surveys, questionnaires, and interviews. They can be applied as structured, semi-structured, or 
open-ended instruments. They provide qualitative information about design and produce data on 
a level that some may feel to be closer to the reality of design. They can touch phenomena that 
are difficult to address by experimental, quantitative methodology.  
The scope of qualitative methodology is largely determined by what the informants know and 
are able to tell. The investigators’ role in interpreting data is vital. For many activities, including 
idea generation (Landau, Marsh, & Parsons Iv, 2000; Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1997), subjects’ 
insights about how they perform some activity may be very biased. The reliability and the 
validity of qualitative research are maybe even more critical than in experimental studies. In 
experimental research, poor research design typically produces null results without challenging 
the null hypothesis, in qualitative research poor design may produce seemingly important 
findings that are impossible to explain by any other factor than the poor design itself (e.g. badly 
formulated forced choice items). 
The gap between qualitative and quantitative methods is not necessarily a very clear one. 
Typically data acquired by questionnaires, for example, are analyzed as if they were quantitative 
and examined using factorial analysis, uni- or multivariate analysis of variance, 
multidimensional scaling, correspondence analysis, and so forth. As a consequence, the reported 
results may closely resemble those of experimental research even though the nature of the 
research is very different (e.g. in Publication V). 
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 2.3 Phenomena of Design Idea Generation  
Experimental research has so far examined a number of independent variables for their 
influence on design IG. The results of design experimentation could be enumerated as a long list 
of studies that complement, contradict, or have nothing to do with each other. The approach I 
favor here is to group the work along research questions, or the phenomena of idea generation. 
The features I will consider are idea clustering, stimulation, fixation, and time pressure. All 
these phenomena relate to cognitive processes, in the spirit of semi-transparent box thinking. 
They have been selected here because they are good examples of what can be explained by 
using cognitive vocabulary. 
2.3.1 Clustering and similarity 
In an effective design idea generation session, participants are expected produce many ideas in a 
short period of time. For instance, Kelley (Kelley & Littman, 2005) states that a typical one 
hour session at IDEO consultancy yields approximately hundred ideas. However, it is very 
unlikely that all those ideas would be radically different from each other. Clustering of ideas 
refers to the fact that ideas consecutively produced by one individual tend to be similar to each, 
i.e. are clustered (Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2002, 2003). Clusters are usually though of as 
categories, which in psychology refers to sets of related concepts (Barsalou, 1983; Rosch, 
1978), akin to how Wittgenstein defined family resemblance in philosophy (Rosch & Mervis, 
1996; Wittgenstein, 1953). The categorical structure is seen as a constituent for human 
cognition and therefore, for instance, studies of IG attempt to investigate how ideas produced in 
creative tasks reflect this assumed internal structure.  
Clustering is thus an observable, behavioral phenomenon that stems from a psychological 
structure. Mental categories have so called graded structure which means that the boundaries of 
the categories are not unequivocal (Barsalou, 1983). This makes it difficult to judge intuitively 
when the category limits are exceeded. To give an example, is pea a fruit or a vegetable? 
However, in experimental studies, a large pool of ideas can help to establish categories that 
independent human judges can agree on. For instance, the definition of categorical fluency in 
the traditional tests of creative thinking relies on this notion (Torrance, 1974). An interesting, 
related feature of clustering and functioning of the creative cognition is the clustering of initial 
ideas across a large pool of people. The first ideas are typically quite stereotypic and often 
shared between members of a group consisting of people from similar backgrounds (Publication 
II; Finke et al., 1992).  
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 2.3.2 Effects of examples 
Stimulation is the ‘positive’ effect that consulting external material prior to or during idea 
generation has. Many design practitioners share the view that all sort of external material can 
help and inspire the production of new designs. With some precautions, this seems to be the 
case (Coskun, Paulus, Brown, & Sherwood, 2000; Dugosh, Paulus, Roland, & Yang, 2000; 
Nijstad et al., 2002), although the evidence from product design is scarce (Perttula & Sipilä, 
2007). The stimulation is believed to help designers to get started with the ideation process. The 
stimulation helps mainly to create ideas that are similar to the stimuli, i.e. are from the same or 
closely related mental categories. For this reason, heterogeneous stimuli presenting multiple 
categories are preferred and have been found to facilitate the production of more diverse ideas. 
This is also indirectly supported by findings from basic creativity research, which has examined 
the introduction of unrelated stimuli or randomly constrained thinking as a helpful factor for 
creative efforts (Finke et al., 1992; Howard-Jones et al., 2005). 
Fixation is the down side of stimulation. It refers to the negative impact of examples. As stated, 
stimulation helps people by shifting the IG process to a certain direction, which might also be 
unwanted. A number of studies under the label of ‘design fixation’ have tried to characterize 
this process in design (see also Jansson & Smith, 1991; Publication VI; Purcell & Gero, 1996; 
Purcell, Williams, Gero, & Colbron, 1993). They define design fixation as a tendency to 
unknowingly reproduce parts of the given examples to independent work. This occurs even if 
the examples contradict the design requirements. Similar phenomenon is described as 
unconscious plagiarism in the psychological literature (Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Marsh, 
Bink, & Hicks, 1999; Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996; Marsh et al., 1997; S. M. Smith, 1995; S. 
M. Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 1993). In all, this evidence points out that fixation and 
stimulation are real phenomena that should not be ignored and can not be easily evaded by 
simple manipulation of task brief or instruction.  
2.3.3 Time effects 
There is a lack of research regarding time factors in design idea generation. Many IG 
experiments employ setups that control time (e.g. time decomposition in Dennis et al., 1999) 
and thus are connected to the time factors. But because fixed intervals are used, the effect of 
time remains hidden. Publication IV presented a first step to analyze the time effects 
encountered in IG and is paraphrased here. Based on research on other areas of idea generation, 
there are at least three time pressure effects, incubation, total time for IG, and perceived time 
pressure. Incubation is a controversial topic that originates from the four-phase process model 
of creativity formulated by Wallas in early 20th century (quoted in Weisberg, 1986). Wallas 
  47 
 argued that the creative process proceeds from problem finding to incubation and eventually to 
illumination, or insight, followed by verification. Psychologists and design researchers have 
more recently tried to assess what good does incubation, time off task, do for the problem 
solving. The main questions have been, does incubation help, and if it does, why? 
Wallas thought incubation would be a necessary period of unconscious problem solving 
preceding insight. In 1980’s Weisberg refuted this explanation, claiming that there is no 
evidence of unconscious problem solving. Regardless of the explanation, several investigations 
in general psychology (Ellwood, Pallier, Snyder, & Gallate, 2009; Mandler, 1994; Snyder, 
Mitchell, Ellwood, Yates, & Pallier, 2004), and also in design IG (Shah, Smith, & Vargas 
Hernandez, 2006), have demonstrated that incubation period does improve IG performance. The 
recent meta-analysis by Sio and Ormerod (2009) supports this view. As their conclusion, the 
authors indicate a positive incubation effect particularly for ‘divergent thinking’ tasks in 
comparison to visual or linguistic insight tasks. The effect is augmented by a longer duration 
and decreased cognitive load during the incubation period. 
Total time for IG refers to the productivity over a period of time in the context a relatively short, 
single IG session. Several studies that have followed the course of ideation show that 
productivity seems to steadily decrease over time, but does not die out completely (Howard-
Jones & Murray, 2003; Publication VI; Kelly, Futoran, & McGrath, 1990). Productivity over 
time is also characterized by an initial peak in productivity, which occurs during the first 3-5 
minutes of the IG session. This repeated finding is visualized in Figure 2.2. A study by Snyder, 
Mitchell, Ellwood, Yates, & Pallier (2004) demonstrated that the initial peak in productivity 
repeats after a 5 min break, as the notion of incubation would predict. 
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Figure 2.2 Typical rate of idea generation as a function of time when the process is not 
manipulated during the session. Adapted from Figure 2 of publication IV. 
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 Time pressure is a psychological variable, based on perceived demand and available time. As all 
phases of the design process must be adjusted to fit organizational time tables, time pressure can 
influence design on many levels (see Publication IV). Naturally it is particularly visible in low 
level actions, such as IG, which maybe scheduled for couple hours, after which results are 
expected. The level of interest here is hence an IG session. Time pressure has been repeatedly 
suggested to relate to ‘creativity’ as an inverted U-shape curve (Amabile, 1998; Baer & 
Oldham, 2006) such as the one displayed in Figure 2.3. This suggests that both too much and 
too little time can hamper creativity (combined novelty and utility). This is quite logical when it 
comes to the scarcity of time, as any system exploring a multitude of opportunities with a 
limited processing rate will necessary resort to shallow processing and respond too quick or 
with too few opportunities, as a consequence of limited processing time. Top performance at the 
asymptote of the curve implies that if the time and requirements match with person’s self-
perceived capability then this can lead to high motivation and superior task performance. The 
top performance level will very likely resemble a flow experience, which is argued to be 
associated with high creative output (Csikzentmihalyi, 1996). The right end of the curve 
apparently reflects a lack of motivation. It should be noted that the obvious problem with this 
description is that the ‘right’ time pressure need to be empirically defined for each case (e.g. in 
Kelly & Karau, 1993). 
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Figure 2.3 Curvilinear relation of creativity and perceived time pressure on a large time 
scale (e.g. the whole concept generation phase). Adapted from Figure 3 of publication IV. 
A common observation is thus that some amount of time pressure can at least temporarily 
increase productivity and creativity. This can be understood through a cognitive entrainment 
theory (Kelly et al., 1990; Kelly & Karau, 1993; F. J. M. Reid & Reed, 2000). The entrainment 
theory is based on the idea that humans have internal, biological rhythms that regulate many 
bodily functions and influence overt behavior. Another assumption is that these rhythms can be 
externally adjusted to some extent. For instance, person may compensate for the shortage of 
time (increased time pressure) by increasing effort. More importantly, this change may sustain 
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 for a short period of time even if the task requirements change and the time pressure is lifted. 
This leads to a hypothesis that if an idea generation session is divided into two parts and the first 
part has high time pressure, then it will induce an increase in productivity for the second part. 
This increase will also affect the following session, even if the time pressure disappears.  
There is some experimental evidence supporting the cognitive entrainment hypothesis. Kelly 
and associates (Kelly et al., 1990; Kelly & Karau, 1993) have investigated entrainment in a 
setup in which three consecutive idea generation rounds with a variable amount of time pressure 
are compared. The pressure levels were determined empirically by observing how much time 
pilot participant usually took to complete the task. Their results show that initial high time 
pressure does increase productivity, but may also inhibit creativity (expert ratings on 7-point 
scale). Figure 2.4 depicts this relation: 
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Figure 2.4 Productivity and creativity under different levels of initial time pressure, 
according to Kelly and associates (Kelly et al., 1990; Kelly & Karau, 1993).  
Adapted from Figure 4 of publication IV. 
However, if after a high pressure IG round more time is given for the following round, the rate 
of productivity remains high but the creativity of the ideas may also be improved. In a condition 
where initial time pressure is low but increases towards the last session, the average creativity 
remains lower (Kelly et al., 1990; Kelly & Karau, 1993). One may notice an evident difference 
to Figure 2.3 (the absence of leveling creativity under low time pressure), which is probably 
best understood as a consequence of a very different time line and incommensurable measures 
of creativity. The low time pressure condition in the studies of Kelly and Karau is not really 
long enough to decrease motivation for the task. Reid and Reed (2000) have also tested the 
entrainment hypothesis in an engineering design environment. Instead of applying typical idea-
generation research methods, they performed a conversational analysis of the design team 
interactions. Their results also bespeak of an entrainment effect, cycling between reasoning and 
communication activities is influenced by the time pressure.  
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 2.4 Models of Idea Generation 
As theoretical constructs, models come close to theories but are more complex. In cognitive 
science, models fall between theories and more extensive cognitive frameworks. Cognitive 
models can be heuristic, theoretical, or computational. The computational models are the 
hallmark of cognitive science and further divide into symbolic and connectionist models. 
Modeling the design IG process is a relatively new initiative. Only in the last couple of years 
there have been published attempts to present cognitive models of design IG (Publication VII; 
Vargas Hernandez et al., 2007). This work on design can be seen as an extension to generic IG 
theories in social psychology and recent advances in creative cognition research. 
It is important to note that the models of idea generation should not be equaled with the models 
of creativity (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). Those models try to cover a much wider area of 
human activity and typically the majority of all creative domains. IG models are concentrated in 
explaining and describing conscious, focused, short-term activity. Where as theories and models 
of creativity explain high-level creativity, or H-creativity (Boden, 2004), IG models are more 
concerned with more down to earth, everyday, or personal creativity, if they even should talk 
about creativity. For instance, the creativity model GenePlore (Finke et al., 1992) is relevant to 
the topic, but the model is too general and abstract to be introduced here in detail. Similarly, the 
Concept-Knowledge theory (Hatchuel & Weil, 2009) describes reasoning in design and makes 
an effort to explain design creativity through expansions of knowledge and concepts. However, 
it is excluded here because of its generality and non-psychological nature. 
Cognitive psychology has a long tradition in modeling various problem solving branches. For 
example, architectural design has been treated quite well in the past (Akin, 1986). Similarly, for 
design there are several known frameworks that have been used to describe design activity 
found in verbal protocols (Akin & Lin, 1995; Dorst, 1995; Gero & McNeill, 1998; Gero & 
Tang, 2001; Goel & Pirolli, 1992; Purcell & Gero, 1998). However, the idea generation phase of 
design process has not been particularly emphasized in this tradition as the descriptions have 
spanned the whole concept development process. This is an important difference because the 
cognitive operations that are essential in the idea generation phase maybe different from the 
operations required in other phases of the design process. 
If we look for psychological models that address idea generation in particular, we can find two 
examples from social psychology. These models are the matrix model (Brown, Tumeo, Larey, 
& Paulus, 1998; Coskun et al., 2000) and SIAM (Nijstad, 2000; Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). Their 
common element is the reference to a data structure, to human memory and its probabilistic 
sampling, but they embed this mechanism in very different models. They assume that ideas, or 
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 their components, already exist in the memory and during idea generation they are retrieved 
from memory for the construction of new ideas. In addition to these two models, I will introduce 
Cognitive Network Model of Creativity coming from innovation management domain and 
Vargas Hernandez Ideation model, which specifically describes design IG. Common in all four 
is the inclusion of a memory search component. All these models are also focused on individual 
level, although models about groups as cognitive units and idea generators have just recently 
emerged (De Dreu et al., 2008). Groups are not in the interest of this study, but their research 
may prove to be significant for design research as well. 
2.4.1 Matrix model 
The matrix model (Brown et al., 1998; Coskun et al., 2000) is based on the psychological 
finding that human memory is organized into categories of information. (Barsalou, 1983; 
Lakoff, 1986; Rosch, 1978). It is further assumed that ideas are clustered into categories, so that 
similar bits of knowledge are associated with the same category. In this model, to produce an 
idea, it must be retrieved from memory. The retrieval is probabilistic, i.e. ideas have different 
retrieval probabilities, making some common and typical, some rare and novel. The retrieval 
does not take a chance on retrieving only one idea. Instead, several ideas are consecutively 
retrieved. The categorical structure of the memory influences the process so that access to one 
category inhibits succeeding access to other categories. In other words, ideas from the same 
category are easier to retrieve whereas ideas from a different category are less likely to be 
retrieved. This is described with category transition probabilities (Brown et al., 1998; Coskun et 
al., 2000). It should be noted that although this view of memory is inspired by psychological 
theory, in comparison to the psychological theories of categorization and the structure of 
cognition, the matrix model is very limited and abstract. 
Paulus and his associates have made empirical experiments to evaluate the fit of empirical data 
to this model. In particular, they have studied clustering of ideas and how the idea generation 
process matches the cluster structure assumed in the matrix model. Their results indicate that 
presenting cues throughout the session helps reminding the categories of ideas available to idea 
generators and clustering predicted by the model does occur (Brown et al., 1998; Coskun et al., 
2000). 
2.4.2 Search for Ideas in Associative Memory model SIAM  
Search for Ideas in Associative Memory (SIAM) IG model has been developed by Nijstad and 
associates (Nijstad, 2000; Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). Unlike the matrix model, SIAM does not 
make detailed assumptions about the human memory structure. The main thesis is simply that 
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 the memory is associative – all pieces of information are interconnected. This structure allows 
for a functionally categorical structure but does not necessitate it. SIAM is more detailed about 
the process of turning retrieved memory contents into new ideas. The model is composed of two 
phases, memory retrieval and idea production. Both are detailed in Figure 2.5 below: 
Find knowledge 
k using c
Notice failure Memorize and output i
Generate idea i 
based on k
End search?
TERMINATE
START
Interpret problem and 
assembly search cue c
Notice failure
Is k new? Is i new?
Abandon k?
Idea retrieval Idea productionyes
yes
yes
yesno no
no
no
 
Figure 2.5 Process model of SIAM. The two main phases of idea generation, retrieval (left) 
and production (right). Adapted from Publication II. 
The SIAM model includes some important psychological properties and concepts that are not 
considered in the matrix model. The differences are evident in the memory retrieval phase, in 
which search cue plays an important role. Cue is necessary in order to be able to access any 
information from the memory. It is assumed that the associations between cue and bits of 
knowledge resident in LTM define what can be retrieved from memory. Consider a Google 
search for ‘dog’ in which a search term (comparable to the cue) initiates the retrieval and points 
to 40 million web pages, one sample of all is retrieved at a time by the Internet user (it must be 
emphasized that Google search is otherwise totally incomparable to SIAM search). Another 
important feature in the retrieval phase is process control. Sometimes it may turn out impossible 
to retrieve new information and these errors must be monitored while searching for pieces of 
knowledge. 
Idea production phase of SIAM receives its input from the memory search. This input is called 
‘images’ (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006) which may be slightly misleading since the input is not 
required to be pictorial, but rather an image in the sense of speaking more than thousand words, 
potentially a big chunk of information. It is clearly a larger amount of information than what is 
accessed in the matrix model and can be used as raw material for producing several ideas. 
Functionally this resembles clustering of ideas predicted by the matrix model. 
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 In their review paper, Nijstad and Stroebe (2006) consider empirical proof for SIAM. They go 
through evidence on individual and group level IG. The reviewed studies show two types of 
clustering, semantic and temporal, both predicted by the model. Semantic clustering was already 
demonstrated in association to the matrix model evidence. Temporal clustering means that 
people also produce repetitions from the same category quicker than from other categories. 
Because the rate of productivity is increases, the total productivity is also higher when 
clustering occurs, but variety is decreased.  
SIAM allows explicating stimulation and fixation effects. Authors also provide evidence that 
stimulation in IG occurs and can be understood through SIAM as ‘cognitive stimulation’. The 
stimulation hypothesis is that “ideas of others, provided that they are attended to, are added to 
the search cue to activate images in LTM.” (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006) This assumption was 
tested and supported by an empirical study (Nijstad et al., 2002). The number of ideas generated 
increased with idea exposure more than in a control condition. The quality of the examples also 
matters. Heterogeneous stimuli selected from multiple categories induces productivity gains in 
contrast to the homogeneous stimulation and to the control condition. Heterogeneous stimuli 
also increased the availability of new idea categories, having a positive impact on the variety of 
produced ideas. Homogeneous stimulation, on one hand, increased the number of ideas per 
category and thus added to the overall productivity, but on the other hand, decreased the number 
of ideas in the non-stimulated categories in comparison to the heterogeneous stimulation or 
control conditions (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). This corroborates the view presented in 2.3.2 that 
the stimuli can have various effects on the IG process. 
2.4.3 Cognitive Network Model of Creativity CNMC 
The next IG model comes from Santanen, Brigss, and Vreede (2004). Their model is called 
Cognitive Network Model of Creativity, abbreviated here as CNMC. The model is intended to 
be predictive in contrast to prominent descriptive accounts of creativity. Even though the 
authors stress the creativity aspect, CNMC appears to be essentially an IG model. Like SIAM 
and the matrix model, CNMC is also based on the idea of connected pieces of knowledge, 
which are called frames. CNMC claims that in idea generation, multiple frames are brought 
together and creativity arises “when two or more frames not previously associated with one 
another are activated together in the context of some new problem.” (Santanen et al., 2004 p. 
176) The process of activating frames is thus essential. It can happen through two paths: by 
external stimuli activating certain frames or through activation spreading in the LTM networks. 
Activated frames become available to working memory and can be combined to produce new 
ideas, as shown in Figure 2.6 on the following page: 
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Figure 2.6 Illustration of idea production in the Cognitive Network Model of Creativity 
based on Santanen et alia (2004). New idea (bottom right) is produced by combining 
frames active in working memory to form a new idea. 
The creative process is restricted by the capacity of working memory. Working memory can 
only hold some frames active at a time. This means that to produce a good idea, the right frames 
need to be activated simultaneously. This leads to the predictive part of CNMC. If too many 
external influences are introduced too rapidly, none of them can be properly attended to. 
Properties of long-term memory may also constrain creativity because activation may not spread 
enough in order to activate and bring together disparate frames. This will also prevent the 
generation of creative ideas. (Santanen et al., 2004) 
If the CNMC model is analyzed or compared to the other models, it is clear that the 
specification is not very detailed. It remains unclear how ideas are really produced, how long-
term memory is actually organized, how frames are accessed, or even what they are. However, 
authors do provide some experimental evidence to test the predictions they derive from CNMC 
(Santanen et al., 2004). They address two research questions: how external stimuli delivered at a 
constant rate affect IG and how does stimuli topic switching (cf. heterogeneous stimuli in 2.4.2) 
affect creativity? Their study evaluated how different temporal patterns of stimulation affected 
idea production by changing IG topics on different intervals using prompts. The finding was 
that topic changes occurring every 4 minutes did not affect IG in comparison to a session 
without prompts. However, groups that had a change every 2 or 8 minutes had mutually similar, 
high levels of creativity, but in greater numbers in the 8 minute condition. 
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2.4.4 Vargas Hernandez Ideation Model VHIM 
The final idea generation model to be presented here comes from Vargas Hernandez, Shah, and 
Smith (2007). This contribution is here called the Vargas Hernandez Ideation Model, or VHIM. 
This proposal might be better called a framework as they present a very complex theory about 
cognitive mechanisms required for design IG. VHIM is actually a composition of several model 
variants each intended to explain specific phenomena occurring during idea generation. The 
structure of VHIM begins from a schema that includes the basic elements for distinct ideation 
component models. This structure is visualized in Figure 2.7 below. 
 
Figure 2.7 Main schema of VHIM consisting of four basic information processing 
components (vertical boxes) utilized by six different ideation component models 
(horizontal). In the figure, the component models are illustrative, they are not aligned 
according to the basic components (not informative). 
The schema includes several basic components, or elements, that correspond to basic 
psychological functions. As parts of the schema, the authors include separate models for basic 
components including encoding and externalization process, memory storage, memory 
retrieval, external memory, and problem assimilation. The models rely on different cognitive 
constructs, derived mainly from the human information processing framework (Newell & 
Simon, 1972), but also including features from more recent cognitive theories. The schema also 
makes a distinction between WM and LTM. The authors introduce two interfaces, called lines 
Encoding & 
Externalization  
External 
memory 
Problem 
assimilation 
Example exposure 
Incubation 
Memory 
storage & 
retrieval 
Provocative stimuli 
Frame of reference shifting 
Suspended judgment 
Flexible representation 
Information processing models Ideation component models Legend: 
 that separate external environment from the environment (biological line) and the LTM capacity 
from working memory capacity (knowledge line). As an example, the basic component for 
memory retrieval is presented in Figure 2.8. It includes three main functions, recognition, 
search, and check. These are aligned with the biological and the knowledge line. 
 
Figure 2.8 Memory search component of VHIM. Figure 4 of  
Vargas Hernandez, Shah, and Smith (2007) 
©ASME international, reprinted with permission 
After the cognitive framework for VHIM has been laid out, the authors proceed to apply and 
modify it to the design ideation context. They present a set of cognitive models of ideation 
components addressing effects of incubation, example exposure, provocative stimuli, frame of 
reference shifting, suspended judgment, and flexible representation. These six models are 
adaptations of the basic component models with some additional mechanisms to account for the 
particular ideation component.  
For instance, the example exposure model (see Figure 2.9, the next page) extends problem 
assimilation component. It specifies that examples need to be abstracted immediately following 
the internal representation. The extracted abstract features are used as cues for analogical 
comparison to retrieve ideas from LTM. After this step, the idea production proceeds according 
to the basic model of problem assimilation. Similar modifications are included in all component 
models. For details about the schema, the basic models, and ideation component models see 
Vargas Hernandez et al. (2007).  
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Figure 2.9 Ideation component model for example exposure. Figure 2 of  
Vargas Hernandez, Shah, and Smith (2007) 
©ASME international, reprinted with permission 
Along with the model, the authors also discuss how empirical data they have previously 
acquired fits the model. It must be acknowledged that the authors have built VHIM after a 
substantial empirical work (Shah et al., 2000; Shah, Smith et al., 2003; Shah, Vargas Hernandez 
et al., 2003) which implies that it should have a good bottom-up fit. The introduction of separate 
IG component models clearly shows this development. As an example, the authors illustrate the 
frame of reference shifting model in accounting for some previous data (Shah et al., 2006). They 
state that “designer departs from the original problem to solve an alternative problem with 
different constraints. … When returning to the original problem solving, the alternate solutions 
provide inspiration for novel approaches, but the quality of these ideas suffers since it solves a 
different problem.” This is used to explain the observation why the usefulness of ideas evoked 
by frame of reference shifting decreases. 
Due to the huge scope of VHIM, it is fairly vulnerable to criticism. It evidently aims very high 
and tries deal with issues that are not yet fully comprehended even within the founding 
disciplines. In particular, the psychological plausibility of the assumptions and mechanisms 
proposed within the model is questionable on some instances, for instance the structure and 
mechanisms of working memory, and the concept extended LTM are debatable. However, the 
value of VHIM lies in proposing a host of theoretical ideas that could help understanding the 
phenomena of design IG in a heuristic way, rather than thoroughly explaining design IG. 
  58 
 3 Theory of  Design Idea Generation Process  
“We should be aware of why there is reluctance to try to make design processes 
explicit. Because processes and product are highly intermixed, making explicit 
ones process gives away some of their design secrets. Others may be able to 
replicate their designs by replicating their process. Or even more critically, 
 the process may be analyzed and criticized.” 
(Eastman, 1999) 
 
The previous chapter presented four idea generation models, so is their a need for a new theory? 
How could a new proposal advance the state of the art embedded in existing theories? I believe 
that from design perspective, it might be useful to have a model that considers the specifics of 
design and associates this with the best psychological precision available. In this chapter I will 
try to make progress towards this end. I present the main contribution of this thesis, a cognitive 
theory of idea generation in conceptual design, called Model-L. This contribution is primarily 
theoretical and presents an adaptation of SIAM model to conceptual design context. It extends 
this reference model on two parts: connecting it to macro level activities required for design IG 
and on a micro level by specifying new memory-based constraints for the idea production 
process. The model is intended to be comprehensive on the macro level, but constrained on the 
micro level. In other words, it should generally fit the majority of design IG activities but not 
describe all constituent cognitive processes in great detail.  
The general goal of Model-L is to facilitate understanding why certain IG practices can lead to 
certain consequences. For this dissertation, Model-L is a summary and synthesis of the line 
studies initiated in Publication VII, and continued in Publications III, I, and II, indirectly 
supported by IV, V, and VI (see 3.2). Some new contributions also surface when the model is 
applied to the analysis of design IG methods and phenomena. The style of presentation here is 
compact as I attempt to loosely follow a psychological reporting style in laying out the model. 
This makes the model dependent on the referenced explanatory concepts and I have explicated 
some of these dependencies in subsection 3.1.1. 
As argued in Publications I and II, idea generation in conceptual design can be characterized as 
information processing in which external task environment and human cognition interact. In the 
following section, I describe the theory of design IG by introducing the cognitive process and 
knowledge structures required to achieve this functionality on an abstract, heuristic level. The 
model is focused on describing the macro level of design IG and the basic memory mechanisms 
on micro level, rather than trying to provide a comprehensive account of all information 
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 processing that can be involved with design IG. The model relies strongly on the assumption 
that IG is based on the ability to access long-term memory and efficiently retrieve diverse 
ingredients from it, and to exploit these ingredients in a process of producing new ideas.  
In Model-L, the intention is to describe the memory-search part of IG more accurately than in 
previous models, SIAM or VHIM. In comparison to VHIM, it references the latest 
psychological literature and it is more focused on few, elaborated cognitive processes and. This 
means that it considers a subset of design activities. For instance, the expertise model of product 
design by Kruger and Cross (2006) includes eight steps, Gather data, Assess value and validity 
of data, Identify constraints and requirements, Model behaviour and environment, Define 
problems and possibilities, Generate partial solutions, Evaluate solutions, and Assemble a 
coherent solution. Compared to this, Model-L is concerned with only two steps, problem 
definition and the generation of partial solutions. The model is presented as a composition of 
cognitive processes and knowledge (or processed information), with the emphasis on combining 
processes (problem structuring and memory search), which have been described in the 
constituent publications. 
3.1 Model-L of Design Idea Generation 
Model-L is intended to be a descriptive psychological account of IG in design. It attempts to 
describe psychologically what occurs during design IG. This is a crucial difference to the 
prescriptive models of design introduced by Cross (1984), Pahl & Beitz (2007), or Ulrich and 
Eppinger (2008) that advice how one should carry out design tasks. The prescriptive models 
need to be close to the design practice, where as prescriptive, psychological models may 
constrain themselves to a detailed analysis of some very small portion of the whole design 
process.  
In Model-L the idea generation activity is modeled using a four-step macro-level model and 
with a micro-level components which, for example, describe memory-based IG in detail. The 
outline of the macro-level process was presented in Publication VII. This framework discussed 
requirements for generating ideas by accessing LTM contents and was the first attempt to apply 
SIAM to a conceptual design context. The proposal was called cue-based memory probing in 
idea generation (CuPRIG) at the time being (Publication VII). This notion of memory search 
was further developed and clarified in Publication II for the micro-level model and is here 
coupled with the macro-level model introduced in Publication I.  
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 3.1.1 Background assumptions  
The presented theory rests of a number of premises, which are adopted from the psychological 
and design literature. The model introduced here puts together several pieces of the theory, 
some which are transferred beyond their original context. This means that much of the 
credibility of the model relies on the cross-domain applicability of the introduced concepts. I 
present tests of few of the presented concepts in the section 3.2 Empirical Evidence and discuss 
the domain independency assumption in 4.3.  
The main assumption in this thesis is that IG is largely about memory retrieval and knowledge 
reuse. This is generally accepted notion, although its exact formulation differs among writers, 
consider for instance the idea-generation models presented earlier, the GenePlore model for 
creativity (Finke et al., 1992), and the views of creativity and expertise (Klahr & Simon, 1999; 
Weisberg, 1999). The metaphor used here to characterize the function of memory is free recall 
(Nijstad, 2000; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981). This psychological construct is assumed to be 
comparable to idea generation. It must be noted that free recall in psychology refers to a task in 
which people are requested to remember items from a list presented to them some time ago. 
This means that the goals of idea generation and free recall are somewhat different operations. 
Memory search might also be compared to the concepts of cued-recall or ad hoc category 
formation (Barsalou, 1983), but I here remain true to the free recall metaphor. An important 
property of the search is its probabilistic nature. The cue-overload principle states that there are 
usually multiple memories associated with any memory cue (Baddeley et al., 2009). This 
indicates that the retrieval attempt creates a kind of competition, i.e. becomes probabilistic, 
which suits idea generation very well, allowing one set of cues to retrieve a number of different 
memories for idea production (cf. SIAM in 2.5). 
Another major assumption is that the memory-search view can somehow be connected to 
traditional problem-solving models (see Goel & Pirolli, 1992; Simon, 1973). This has not been 
explicitly presented before and therefore poses some additional questions about the validity of 
this approach. One part of the problem-solving process, problem interpretation is considered as 
one of the main components of Model-L. However, the evidence and studies regarding design, 
or ill-structured, problem interpretation are very scarce. The development of the topic in 
Publication I already presents some previously unvoiced ideas, particularly on the role of 
interpretation and implicit decomposition (see the following subsection), but for the most part 
these ideas remain to be tested. 
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 3.1.2 Process 
The first thing required by the IG process is a macro-level control over the activity. The 
designer must have some means of control in attending to a design task to proceed with IG 
(Publication I). In response to the task, the designer produces ideas, descriptions of devices 
satisfying the problem description. In Model-L idea generation is considered as an iterative 
problem-solving or satisfaction process which happens on interpreted, decomposed 
subproblems. In concordance with the prescriptive literature (Cross, 2008; Pahl et al., 2007; 
Ulrich & Eppinger, 2008) and traditional problem solving theories (Egan & Greeno, 1974; 
Laird, Rosenbloom, & Newell, 1986; Newell & Simon, 1972), it is assumed that designer 
mentally constructs the design problem as a combination of multiple features. This idea matches 
with the problem analysis in the prescriptive models of the design methodology thinking by 
Alexander, Jones, and Archer (Alexander, 1963; Archer, 1965; Jones, 1963). In addition to 
decomposition, this procedure is also called subgoaling, problem structuring, or partitioning. 
The macro-level model is illustrated in Figure 3.1 below: 
 
3. Solve 
-Memory-based IG 
-Explicit decomposition 
-Analogical reasoning 
... 
4. Evaluate 
-Accept or reject 
WM ↔ EM 
5. Output 
-Sketch 
-Verbalize 
-Recognition 
-Implicit 
decomposition 
2. Interpret 
1. Strategic control 
WM -Control-strategy selection 
-Goal selection 
Idea generation meta level 
WM ↔ LTM 
WM  
WM ↔ LTM 
Main and subproblem solving 
Figure 3.1 Macro-level model of design IG of Model-L. Model consists of four problem 
solving stages with different memory requirements. Black WM, LTM, and EM boxes 
indicate the shifting of emphasis between working memory, long-term memory, WM-
LTM interaction or WM-EM interaction. Modified from Publication I. 
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 On the top level (stage 1 in the figure), the model includes strategies to control the processing of 
different subgoals. Note that in this iterative development, subgoals are for the first time 
extracted in the second stage. Control strategies come close to Akin’s (1986) global search 
methods. Strategies regulate how subgoals are attended to during IG. Control strategies are 
usually classified into breadth-first and depth-first, reflecting the order and the level of 
abstraction in subgoal processing (Ball & Ormerod, 1995). Both can be labelled as structured, 
top-down problem-solving approaches. The breadth-first strategy requires that each subproblem 
is solved at a certain level of detail before getting into more detail, whereas the depth-first 
strategy means that each subgoal is independently solved to a considerable level of detail before 
attending to the next subgoal. Sometimes these modes unite in apparently opportunistic designs 
(Ball & Ormerod, 1995). Strategic control is assumable a very general, domain-independent 
mechanism used with many types of problems, not just with ill-structured ones. 
At the beginning of the problem-solving process designer must interpret the problem (stage 2 in 
Figure 3.1), that is, produce its mental representation. This representation comes close to what 
has traditionally been called problem space, although it is unlikely that the mental representation 
can include but a tiny part of potential space, in particular when dealing with ill-structured 
design problems. Interpretation, alike the following problem solving stages, is applicable on all 
problem-solving levels, iteratively from the main problem to various subgoal levels, producing 
nested, hierarchical problem spaces. According to Federico (1995), the interpretation of an ill-
structured problem happens by matching the problem description by its surface-level features 
with the existing solution models in LTM. In other words, by comparing it to known problems 
or solutions. 
In Model-L, two important cognitive actions are involved in the interpretation process: 
recognition and implicit decomposition. It is essential that both activities are automatic and 
largely out of conscious control. Recognition is a strong problem-solving method that can lead 
to the immediate discovery of a solution. It is usually described as a spontaneous (implicit) and 
effortless activity, characteristic of expert performance, and dependent on domain knowledge 
(Gobet & Simon, 1998; Lawson, 2004; Stein, 2004). The chances of successfully applying 
recognition increase as the surface-level similarity between the current problem and known 
solutions increases. If the current problem and the known models match poorly, then the 
interpretation process may be extended by analogical reasoning mechanisms, which allow 
transferring knowledge across domains based on conceptual (morphological) similarities (Klahr 
& Simon, 1999). Analogical mapping is assumed to be cognitively more demanding and is 
treated with the problem-solving operations of stage 3. However, this assumption should be 
tested in future, as analogical thinking in brief interpretation has not been studied this far. 
In the current model, recognition is intimately coupled with implicit decomposition. When task-
relevant knowledge is retrieved during a recognition attempt, it seems possible to use the 
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 recovered knowledge to deduce a function structure (subgoals) of the solution, that is to 
effectively decompose the problem. This implies a difference between experts and novices in 
problem decomposition because experts can recognise and recall more complex solutions owing 
to their huge knowledge base, organized in bigger chunks (Akin, 1986). For the same reason, 
experts might be able to find an alternative function structure later on by restarting 
decomposition process explicitly (stage 3 in Figure 3.1). In contrast, novice designers may only 
retrieve incomplete or unfit matches that still provide enough information for implicit 
decomposition. Similar expertise effect on analytical skills has been observed, for instance, in 
classifying physics problems (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). 
If interpretation does not provide a direct solution via recognition, it is still expected to provide 
some kind of a problem structure through implicit decomposition. This should correspond to 
understanding ‘what this design task is about.’ The existence of a problem structure allows the 
designer to start solving individual subproblems (stage 3 in Figure 3.1). The search begins with 
the selection of the most highly prioritized subgoal (Laird et al., 1986). Assuming that the 
solution cannot be achieved by recognition, the solution must be sought using a variety of other 
problem-solving methods. These include, but are not limited to, memory-based mechanisms, 
explicit decomposition, and heuristics of IG (see Akin 1986; Klahr and Simon, 1999). This is 
described in detail in the following paragraphs, which demonstrate how memory search and idea 
production together can generate ideas. 
Explicit decomposition refers to the discovery of a subproblem structure. Decomposition at a 
lower abstraction level must be preceded by higher level decomposition (implicit or explicit), 
because we can not expect the designer to decompose an unknown subproblem, or to satisfy an 
unknown requirement. This also justifies the restriction presented in the educational literature 
that decomposition should precede IG. On the other hand, explicit decomposition may be 
completely skipped if there are no matching solutions (no templates), or if several recognizable 
solutions are available. In the former case, decomposition is impossible, in the latter, it is 
unnecessary for problem solving. 
Memory search is likely the most important source for ideas of across domains, including 
design. In publication II, it was argued that SIAM model (see 2.4.2) provides a good starting 
point for conceptualizing this process, also because it is based on a psychological, tested 
memory model Search of associative memory (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981). However, several 
shortcomings were also noted. Difficulties relate mostly to the fact that the psychological 
memory theories describe experimental data from basic research settings. These experiments 
often have very different goals from IG. Thus some additions that would make SIAM more 
realistic were proposed in Publication II. Specifically, context sensitivity and a limited 
working memory capacity are important properties of human memory that will be considered. 
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 Context sensitivity is an essential feature of human memory. It involves both encoding and 
retrieval of memories. It is important to distinguish what is meant by context, as several 
definitions exist. I use the term context to refer to primarily physical, spatial setting, an 
environment. This matches, for instance, Baddeley’s (1982) definition of independent context in 
which meaning is independent of the context. The function of context provides a way to 
organize human memory. The dependency of human memory on physical context facilitates 
everyday functions by allowing us to more easily recall facts relevant to a certain environment 
when we are there. This enables habituation to patterns that we repeatedly perform during our 
daily routines, such as making breakfast, turning off lights, or flushing the toilet (see Wood & 
Neal, 2007). However, this has the downside that recalling information about remote contexts, 
such as the condition of your kitchen or bathroom while shopping in a supermarket, will be 
more difficult because of the missing contextual cues.  
The argument presented in Publication II is that neglecting context is a major problem for 
present memory-based models of IG. The context dependency is an equally big concern for 
design IG practices. Although no exact statistics exist to my best knowledge, it is very likely 
that the majority of design IG takes places within the protective walls of a R&D department. 
How many companies are actually producing products and services for office environment? If 
the current proposal is on the right track, then one could expect clear benefits for IG to be 
gained if the process was transferred to the intended context of use. This is because the 
contextual change facilitates the access to the relevant body of knowledge, making it more 
readily available for the designer. 
Context sensitivity is related to the search cues, as they are together believed to determine the 
possibilities of the memory-search process. But what exactly are the search cues in memory-
based IG process? This is a tough question as even psychologists building the memory-search 
models have been reluctant to provide any detailed accounts of cues on the algorithmic level 
(Kahana, 1996; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). As argued in Publications VII, III, and II, the 
algorithmic level beyond the superficial level of language (cf. Chomsky, 1957) is non-trivially 
related to the semantic features of the design brief (e.g. linguistic and pictorial information) and 
available information. This means that the externally received cues maybe processed further and 
it impossible to know how they are actually filtered for the memory search (see Harfield, 2007). 
We tested the cue-based search mechanisms in Publications II and III and showed how the 
process at large is sensitive to semantic cues. In our case, we inferred that the provided 
keywords (‘water’ or ‘sun’) had affected memory search by observing a change in the quality of 
produced ideas.  
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 Working memory capacity is another crucial concept in cognitive psychology. It is commonly 
applied to explain various features of mental performance as it provides a major limitation for 
human performance. However, the utilization of WMC is not very straightforward for several 
reasons. The confusions about the construct were already mentioned in Introduction (section 
1.4.2), which implies that the concept WMC might be difficult to apply. Hence, it is not 
surprising that WMC has been somewhat over looked attribute in IG models, expect for CNMC 
model (see 2.4.3). I believe that the WMC limitations have multiple consequences for IG which 
should and partially can be enumerated. This work thus needs to make a stance on WMC. 
Relying on what Unsworth and Engle have recently suggested in the psychological literature 
(Unsworth & Engle, 2007), I assume that working memory is best described as an activated part 
of the LTM, or as a temporary view into LTM. Importantly, WM is not a storage in which 
information from LTM would be temporarily stored in. Instead it is a mechanism that allows 
retrieving information from LTM by performing search operations that can open up access into 
different LTM contents. This feels natural as it consolidates the position of search as a central 
piece in the puzzle. 
Furthermore, Unsworth and Engle argue that there are individual differences in WMC. These 
show in difficulties in focusing the memory search that is low WMC individuals are in a greater 
risk of losing the track of relevant information with regards to the goal of the recall task. 
However, they also posit that low WMC individuals exhibit lower performance in psychological 
memory tests because they associate cues with a larger number of items than high WMC 
individuals. It is not clear what this implicates for creative tasks, such as design, if they are 
considered to comparable to free recall. However, the lack of goal-relevance might discriminate 
between low and high WMC individuals’ IG capacity if we believe that high WMC should 
exhibit higher creative output as well (for indirect evidence about this relation see Gilhooly & 
Murphy, 2005; Rosen & Engle, 1997). The errors may arise from the difficulties in retrieving 
new task-relevant knowledge. It is thus hypothesized that when a person says that they can not 
come up with anything new, they are likely having problems with finding the right information. 
They are stuck retrieving only memories perceived irrelevant and which can not be included for 
idea production. 
Memory search by itself is not enough to produce any new ideas if we assume that the retrieved 
memory contents can not very extraordinary. Therefore a separate idea production mechanism 
is needed. Idea production phase was not extensively elaborated in the formulations of SIAM 
(Nijstad, 2000; Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). This was noted by the authors and in Publication II. 
Gladly, the literature on creative thinking includes a plenty of proposals on how to address this 
gap. Nijstad and Stroebe mention creativity templates (Goldenberg, Mazursky, & Solomon, 
1999) and  similar simple operations of knowledge transformation could be extracted from 
TRIZ creative problem-solving methodology (Altshuller & Shulyak, 1999), or from the IG 
heuristics presented by Osborn (Osborn, 1957) . This would be an instance of fairly simple 
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 associative thinking in which two or more ordinary concepts are combined to produce a novel 
idea. For instance, one could associate a cactus and a gun to produce a novel spiked weapon. 
There are already detailed computational theories of how this kind of conceptual blends or 
conceptual combinations might be achieved by human cognition. They rely on formalized 
knowledge and have been implemented computationally to produce novel or even ideas (for 
instance, see Binsted, 1996; Costello & Keane, 2000).  
In sum, the memory-based idea production as a separate micro-level module in Model-L is an 
extended version of SIAM. No separate flowchart was presented, as the modifications to the 
SIAM model visualized in Figure 2.5 were small on the process level even if theoretically 
important. 
Analogical reasoning presents a complex mechanism for producing ideas that are creative and 
not trivially produced from the knowledge stored in memory (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; 
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Thagard, Holyoak, Nelson, & Gochfeld, 1990). Theories of 
analogical access and mapping start from formally modelled knowledge representations. By 
considering the structure of knowledge rather than its surface properties, analogical reasoning 
can transfer deep structural properties from one knowledge domain to another. It must be 
mentioned that the basic memory-search mechanisms introduced before are also compulsory for 
analogical reasoning as the knowledge structures needed for the mapping must be first retrieved 
from LTM. As these theories do not contradict or complement the assumptions of the memory-
search model proposed earlier, the reader is advised to consult the references above. 
Having now introduced some processes that can be used to create ideas on the micro level, it is 
time to return to the macro level of idea generation. Eventually all generated solutions must be 
evaluated for their compatibility with the problem in question (stage 4 in Figure 3.1). Stopping 
rules determine what will acceptable as a solution. They should include requirements and 
properties derived from the task brief and from designer’s own style of working (Harfield, 
2007), and be influenced by the previously generated ideas. Only if the solution satisfies the 
stopping rules (Goel & Pirolli, 1992), it will be produced on paper. As an example of the 
stopping rules, designers seeking novel ideas can intentionally discard a solution for being too 
ordinary or trivial. This should be especially important when dealing with recognized solutions 
that are by definition routine answers. If the idea qualifies, then the cycle ends to the output of 
that idea (stage 5 in Figure 3.1). This application of stopping rules controls the iteration of the 
IG process. Due to WMC limitations, it may be necessary to document each subsolution after its 
generation (Bilda & Gero, 2007). For this reason, an additional recomposition procedure seems 
neither necessary nor feasible in IG as the complete solution is always a combination of 
solutions, generated in a serial order after resolving all interdependencies in a linear fashion, 
although some have argued otherwise (Ho, 2001; see also Kruger & Cross, 2006). 
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 3.1.3 Knowledge 
The nature of design knowledge is poorly understood. This is a serious limitation for any theory 
that attempts to present memory-based arguments of design action and also restricts the 
precision that can be achieved in the present thesis. For present purposes it is assumed that the 
memory organization is associative (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981), categorically (Lakoff, 
1986; Rosch, 1978) and contextually (Baddeley, 1982; Unsworth & Engle, 2007) organized. It 
is known for certain that increasing and refining knowledge is a key part in gaining design 
expertise (Cross, 2004b; Lawson, 2004; Lawson & Dorst, 2005), but the actual outcomes, 
contents of the expert designers’ memory are not really understood. There are few proposals 
that make claims about the organization of the design knowledge. For instance Gero (1990) 
discusses ‘prototypes’ as an information representation schema for design knowledge.  
Recently Kurtoglu, Campbell, and Linsey (2009) have introduced a computational conceptual 
design tool, which includes an implementation of design knowledge representation. Their model 
is intended to assist human designers in early conceptual design and idea generation. It 
combines function-based structure synthesis with a graph grammar language to produce 
functions graphs. The graphs are generated automatically by a synthesis algorithm to help in IG. 
The representation model includes functions, components, and their configurations. However 
beyond this and Gero’s proposal, there are apparently no interesting implementations of design 
knowledge representations, at least with regards to design cognition. 
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 3.2 Empirical Evidence 
The Model-L was constructed to answer the main question of thesis, i.e. how are design ideas 
produced, and also to further explicate results from the experiments reported in Publications I 
and II. It includes evidence from the constituent publications of this dissertation. The pieces of 
proof relevant for Model-L in each publication have been enumerated on a coarse level in the 
Table 3.1 on the next page. The publications, I, II, and VI contain more empirical data and are 
analyzed in devoted paragraphs after the table. 
Table 3.1 The relevance of each empirical, constituent publication for Model-L. 
Publication Evidence 
I Associates implicit decomposition with problem interpretation and dissociates 
explicit decomposition from it. Research subjects systematically apply top-
down control strategies, supporting the macro level of Model-L. 
II Study explicates the effects of contextual cueing and verbal stimuli in terms of 
the memory search model embedded on the micro level of Model-L. Contextual 
defaulting points out the role of implicit constraints inherent for each designer. 
III Demonstrates the overlap of initial ideas between independent designers with 
similar education and cultural background. Initial analysis of context and 
stimulation effects. 
IV Disclose the existence of time-related features of design idea generation. 
Assembles data showing compatible with the memory-based idea generation 
model, particularly the initial boost of productivity. 
V Brings evidence of the implicit nature of idea-generation processes and the need 
to help designer students to adopt useful practices for creative work. 
VI Releases new data relevant for understanding cognitive stimulation through the 
variability and timing of stimuli, latter utilized in Publication IV. Shows how 
the stimuli have different potency at various stages of the process. 
 
In the first publication, I analyzed 16 senior students of mechanical engineering working on two 
design idea generation tasks. In the conducted verbal protocol analysis, I focused on primarily 
on problem decomposition and the patterns of problem solving. First, through inference two 
implicit activities of design IG were discovered that had not previously been considered 
together: recognition and implicit decomposition. It was found that the students used top-down 
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 control strategies and quite systematic approaches to generate product concept ideas. The most 
important finding was that in these conceptual design tasks, analytical methods such as explicit 
decomposition were generally playing a minor role and did not seem add any value to the IG 
process. 
The empirical study reported Publication III and re-analyzed for Publication II addressed the 
effect of contextual information and verbal stimuli in design IG. We analyzed conceptual design 
sketches from IG task committed by 50 engineering students. The analysis showed that 
contextual information had an important role in guiding the memory search. The data revealed 
that people commonly make assumptions and introduce implicit and unconscious constraints 
which was described as contextual defaulting. This means that even though designers would in 
principle be free to select any context, they make predictable assumptions about the context for 
IG. For instance, in the study presented in Publication II we gave the students a task of 
designing a ball transportation device for a game. The majority of the subjects interpreted the 
task so that the unspecified game became soccer. However, if we additionally requested that the 
game was a board game, this clearly influenced the generated ideas, implying a change in task 
interpretation, memory search, and idea production. 
Publication VI investigated the dynamics of design IG in two design experiments. In the first 
experiment, the subjects regularly began generating ideas from the most common categories in 
overall. This supports the semantic and temporal clustering previously observed in relation to 
SIAM. As these clusters were exhausted they moved on to generate ideas from less typical 
categories. This is understandable if the memory search part is functioning stochastically as 
assumed. The most typical categories will be explored first, because they are the easiest to 
access. The second experiment was focused on the use of pictorial examples to stimulate design. 
Both experiments tracked the time dimension and showed that the designers were always more 
productive and categorically most flexible during the first 15 or 20 min time period. The results 
about the stimulation showed that in the early phase, the quality of stimulus does not make a 
difference. However, novel, heterogeneous stimuli can be beneficial if administered during the 
duration of idea generation. This fits the model if we assume that initial IG is a more bottom-up 
activity and attention to examples is paid later on. 
The study presented in Publication V does not directly associate with any of the parameters of 
the model. However, it becomes relevant for the discussion once we consider the justification 
and the need for the theory. The study documents the fact that people taking part in idea 
generation are not recognizing the IG process, its features and special needs. Particularly group 
work may turn out to feel frustrating because the students have not learned the right ‘creative’ 
practices required for productive idea generation. This supports the argument about the implicit 
nature of idea generation as a process which can be carried out quite effortlessly and without 
much thought to it.  
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 3.3 Theoretical Applications of the Model  
Having now laid out a suggestion about how design IG as a cognitive activity might be 
organized, let us analyze some idea-generation practices presented in section 1.3.2. As indicated 
in the following paragraphs, some these observations have already been made in the literature, 
but some are presented here for the first time. For instance, stimulation from prototyping and 
time pressure effects are likely analyzed here for the first time. Starting from the IG methods 
associated with product design, it is argued that these methods can produce two kinds of effects: 
memory search and task constraints effects. As I will next present these effects, it should be 
noted that these categories are not mutually exclusive; the same method can produce both kinds 
of effects.  
Memory search, as described above, is susceptible to many variables. External stimuli, product 
examples and ideas from other designers, can produce both negative and positive influences. In 
SIAM, it is assumed that design fixation must take effect via regular memory search 
mechanisms. This means that fixation can affect the search-cue-formation process, later 
emerging sampling set, or associations in LTM. The example (stimuli) that initially activates the 
participants’ long-term memory representations also strengthens the association between the 
search cue (and consecutively the task description) and those particular solutions in memory. 
This leads to their augmented probability of being sampled later on in the memory-search 
process, which manifests in design fixation. (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006) 
The impact of examples may not be solely detrimental. The beneficial effects of external ideas 
have been investigated under the topic of cognitive stimulation. Psychologists and design 
researchers have repeatedly shown how idea exposure can positively influence one’s ability to 
produce ideas (e.g. Brown et al., 1998; Coskun et al., 2000; Dugosh & Paulus, 2005; Dugosh et 
al., 2000; Nijstad et al., 2002; Perttula & Sipilä, 2007). The primary mechanism of cognitive 
stimulation is that the presented ideas can be used in the search cue providing access to 
knowledge that would have been inaccessible without the stimuli. This facilitates switching 
between idea categories (Nijstad and Stroebe, 2006) which is considered to be an indicator of 
flexibility in IG. This will also speed up knowledge retrieval in contrast to working without 
examples, because the time required to assemble and change the cue is reduced. The model also 
predicts that the initial overlap of stereotypical ideas might be evaded by administering 
uncommon examples (Nijstad et al., 2002). It has been already shown that if examples are from 
similar or the same categories, then they will lead to a search cue which effectively probes the 
same mental categories (Brown et al., 1998; Nijstad et al., 2002) and fewer ideas will be found 
from other categories. The timing of example ideas is also essential as providing a host of ideas 
at once will give each example less attention than they would receive if they were presented 
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 during the IG process, as usually happens in group settings (Coskun et al., 2000; Perttula & 
Sipilä, 2007). 
In design world, some design techniques might be linked to cognitive stimulation effects. What 
cognitive function do prototypes and sketches serve? It have been previously claimed that 
sketching can off-load working memory load (Bilda & Gero, 2007; Bilda, Gero, & Purcell, 
2006). As discussed before, prototypes and sketches can act as communication devices in a 
design team. For an individual designer, especially prototypes seem to serve a discovery and 
memory function, parts of what Ulrich and Eppinger (2008) discussed under the umbrella of 
‘learning’ function. This function could be argued to be similar to incubation (Ellwood et al., 
2009; Mandler, 1994; Shah, Smith et al., 2003; S. M. Smith, 1995; Snyder et al., 2004; 
Weisberg, 1993) the process of externalizing thinking in prototypes and sketches can shift the 
attention away from fixated memory. As the person returns to process the task and the 
prototype, the IG process can continue stimulated by the prototype or the evaluation of the 
prototype may lead into new problem formulations that can provide a fresh start for the IG 
process. However, to my best knowledge, these aspects of prototyping as variables in a 
cognitive process have not been much studied. For example, Dow and associates have recently 
examined similar questions (Dow, Heddleston, & Klemmer, 2009) but not quite touched this 
issue. We need first to define testable hypotheses regarding the significance of prototypes and 
then trial them in design experiments. 
Task constraints present another category effects which seem to have their primary influence 
to the final phase of IG, evaluation (stage 4 in Figure 3.1). It is assumed that the more 
requirements are added by some method, the more difficult it becomes to generate ideas. 
Because of multiple constraints that all set requirements for what is an acceptable idea together 
with designer’s personal aspirations (style and level of doing things, see Harfield, 2007). For 
instance, consider techniques that gather user needs as an inspiration for design. As more needs 
are expressed, it becomes progressively more difficult to find a solution satisfying them all. 
Compare this to impossible tasks of designing either one car or one bag for all. This is also 
similar to the Brainstorming rule (Osborn, 1957) ‘no criticism’ which basically opposes the 
presentation of seemingly impossible constraints. 
In response to the challenge of multiple constraints, Cross (2008) presents several techniques for 
grouping and analyzing multiple product requirements, in a way similar to Alexander’s analysis 
of village design requirements (Alexander, 1963). Consequently, it seems justified to avoid 
using comprehensive user needs and technical constraints sets in the early phases of conceptual 
design. This also seems to be distinctive between the two introduced disciplines, product and 
interaction design. In product design the question of ‘what to design’ seems often to be given 
beforehand and a certain user need is fixed, like in the process description from Ulrich and 
Eppinger (2008). In that model, it was visible that in concept development, needs should be 
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 defined early on and are distinct from IG. In contrast, interaction design methods begin from 
exploring ‘what the user might need’ which gets mingled with ‘what to design’, certainly 
contributing to the perceived the complexity of the task. In interaction design it does not seem 
so clear that user needs and requirements are entirely settled before the first suggestions about 
the design are made. This also shows in the nature of IG methods introduced in section 1.3.2. 
Time constraints were reviewed for Publication IV. However, that paper did not articulate how 
different time-related effects might be grounded in a cognitive theory of design IG. In section 
2.3.3 three categories of time effects were introduced: incubation, productivity over time, and 
time pressure. The main effect of productivity over time was the initial boost in productivity 
witnessed during the first 4-5 minutes of the session. This is fairly easy to understand in terms 
of the memory sampling mechanisms. The memory search initially may yield a large result set 
with many target items. While these are being retrieved for IG, the ratio of new targets and old 
targets turns into a less favorable one as the memory search continues. In any case, the 
efficiency decreases. If the search set is not updated by a change of the cues, (for instance, using 
a frame of reference shifting studied by Shah et al., 2003), it will get progressively more 
difficult to retrieve new ideas. This will first challenge the idea production as there is a lack of 
new input, and then slowly affect the whole idea generation process. The same explanation can 
be applied to incubation as well. If we assume that active WM contents are differentiated from 
the rest of LTM by some activation value, then it follows that this value may ‘decay’ and make 
the associated LTM content more difficult to access as more time goes by. This is what happens 
during incubation period. As the traces between previous solution attempts decay, proactive 
interference (e.g. in Feldman Barrett et al., 2004) caused by previous solution attempts 
(retrieved LTM contents) vanishes and new memories can be retrieved. This provides a way out 
of mental ‘ruts’ (S. M. Smith, 1995). 
Time pressure can affect recall and production components of the memory-based IG part. 
Recalling information from memory is not an error free process. The desired information, such 
as your mother’s maiden name, or her birthday in the worst case, may be difficult to retrieve if it 
has not been recently rehearsed. The retrieval may fail or slow down. In idea generation context, 
the lack of time may result in constrained memory sampling and recall. Some might label this as 
reduced exploration of the problem space (Shah, Vargas Hernandez et al., 2003). As a 
consequence, the ingredients for the generation phase will be more stereotypical and less novel. 
It could be hypothesized that of all possible combinations of the ingredients, only the most 
obvious or already existing solutions will be generated and output if the time pressure is high.  
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 4 Discussion 
In this chapter I evaluate and recap the main contributions of this thesis. I will show where and 
how the presented design theory might be useful and what sorts of issues it has. As a conclusion 
for the work, I discuss requirements and visions for design cognition research in the future. 
4.1 Contribution 
In this thesis I have advocated a cognitive theory of idea generation which describes the early 
phases of conceptual design. I have taken the perspective of a theorist. I believe that in building 
a cognitive theory of conceptual design, it is wiser to start from robust, state-of-the-art 
psychological constructs. These are the invariants derived from the study of people, properties 
of human beings that will remain constant for years to come, no matter what sort new 
methodologies arise or creativity support tools (Shneiderman, 2007) be introduced. As long as 
the main responsibility in ideation rests on the hands of human designers and is not invested in 
an artificial or augmented intelligence, information about how people design, the psychology of 
design, will be the most reliable source for all design related theorizing. Of course, to a 
pragmatist all of this may sound insignificant, but as a theorist, I see no better options to hang 
our hopes of developing sustainable view of what design is and how designers manage it.  
I believe that that the main findings here regard the nature of  design idea generation as a 
synthetic, productive activity (Publication I) and the claim that productivity is largely based on 
the capacity to access material found in designers’ memory. There is no denying that there is 
much more to idea generation than just accessing past memories and combining them. However, 
I do think that these factors are a very prominent aspect underlying the results that have been 
acquired in the laboratory studies of design IG like those presented as a part of this thesis. 
The theory itself presents an increment to a model IG called SIAM (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). 
This means that the main contribution is an adaptation and modification of an existing generic 
psychological model to describe IG in conceptual design. Although it is admitted that the scope 
of the present theory does not match some other cognitive formulations of design, the strength 
of the present work is to describe a selected part of the process with increased precision. This is 
very difficult to attain if we start from more extensive models trying to cover the whole 
spectrum of design IG. 
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 4.2 Areas of Application 
The design cognition approach advocated in this thesis produces knowledge that is potentially 
beneficial on two fronts: in the development of design methods and in design education. 
These fields are necessarily related to each other. Even though company-specific best practices 
exist, they do not emerge from a scratch. The methodological skills gained through education 
will shape this process. This should be particularly important in societies such as in Finland, in 
which the level of education is generally high. In their preface, Ulrich and Eppinger (2008) 
describe this relation as follows: “product development --- is like sailing: proficiency is gained 
through practice, but some theory of how sails work and some instruction in the mechanics (and 
even tricks) of operating the boat help tremendously.”  
In Publication IV we demonstrated that the awareness of and competence in concept design 
methods among Finnish future designers was limited. Considering the amount of new design 
methodological knowledge available, the education promoting explicit training in creative 
practice is lagging behind. Design disciplines have traditionally promoted ‘learning by doing’ 
and ‘learning by watching’ approaches which effectively transfer existing tacit knowledge 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). I believe that this learning process could be facilitated by guiding 
future designers also in theory about how creative processes unfold effectively and 
purposefully. I do not believe that there will ever be a ready-made selection of methods that can 
tackle each and every creative challenge in product design. However, I do think that the design 
education could do better in equipping students to embrace future tasks. Stolterman (1994) notes 
that it is important for education to eradicate the ideals of ‘romantic’ (inspirational) design 
thinking and teach students to understand the nature of their work. In the present context, this 
would mean that the emphasis shifts from ‘creative genius’ to a trained idea-ready practitioner. 
Development of design methodology is a controversial topic. On one hand, the hope of 
achieving an ultimate, rational methodology has gone out long ago, but on the other hand, there 
is no denying that both product and interaction design currently boost a wide repertoire of 
design aids. It was previously stated that early attempts to codify the design process with design 
methods went eventually out of fashion (Cross, 1984). Then again, the methods did not die out 
and this is probably because designers have maintained an urge to clear out the fuzzy front-end 
with what ever new broom stick, or IG method, becomes available. The problem is that if 
serious design scholars refuse to commit to method development and evaluation, who is going 
to guarantee that the methods promoted by various independent consultancies really provide any 
advantage for the design organization? I think this is where some sort of revival design 
methodology with healthy precautions is required to meet this challenge.  
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 One could claim that the kind of cognitive design theory and empirical IG studies do not really 
provide answers to the methods riddle, because practice is too far from research. But I argue that 
any creativity method that is in opposition to the proposed basic psychological mechanisms will 
have a weak stance and should require strong experimental evidence to support their adoption. 
If this evidence can be provided this would necessarily point out the need to rethink the 
psychological theory as well. Given the robust research tradition in experimental psychology, I 
do not expect this to happen. This could be compared to the domain of medicine, where the idea 
of evidence-based practice is fundamental to the adoption of any new treatment.  
Finally, some implications for design IG practice can be made based on the present theory. 
Consider the productivity in a typical free-form IG session (see Figure 2.2 on p. 48). It seems 
obvious that this can be altered by providing additional cues for the IG process on appropriate 
intervals, such as every 5-10 minutes. Incubation can also refresh memory search and the use of 
prior ‘kick-start’ IG sessions might also be desirable according to the cognitive entrainment 
theory. In contrast to the findings presented in Publication V, all justified methods that can help 
to structure the IG phase should be sought as designer education currently in Finland is 
preparing the future professionals very well for this task. 
4.3 Limitations 
The development of a cognitive theory by integrating concepts and findings from several fields 
of study has many challenges. The research area, design IG, was defined based on the 
prescriptive literature. As discussed in Publication I, prescriptive literature may not be very 
good starting point if the interest is in developing a design theory to accurately describe and 
understand the cognitive mechanisms required for and involved in real-world early product 
design. Also, it may not be justified to study IG as a cut out and detached piece of the puzzle, 
when in reality, IG is not so temporally-constrained activity and is likely intimately coupled 
with idea evaluation, refinement, and decision making. 
Theoretically, maybe the most important assumption in this work concerns domain 
independence. Much of the present theory is based on generalizing results from basic cognitive 
memory research into an applied area, design research. Also, within design research, I have 
treated different branches of design equivalent. By assuming domain independence, I have been 
able to establish a theoretical framework of how idea generation in design might happen, relying 
on these different areas of study. One might question is this assumption warranted or not. This 
issue is fundamental in psychology as well. Starting from the organization principles of 
cognition (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1984) and extending to the theories of creativity (Brattico & 
Liikkanen, 2009), one can ask whether cognitive mechanisms and capacities underlying creative 
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 behavior are shared. The proponents of the modular approach to cognition and those believing 
in a strong influence of acquired expertise, might refute some of the evidence that I have used to 
support my arguments. For instance, does the different structure of work in architectural design 
impose such requirements for thinking processes that the basics of cognitive system evolve into 
a qualitatively different form (in terms of process and knowledge) as a consequence of adapting 
to a different task environment? What’s more, do fundamental cognitive capacities, memory 
search for instance, differ from knowledge domain to knowledge domain?  
From neuropsychology, we know that the memory for some categories of knowledge is 
modularized and can be dissociated, e.g. memory for tools (names, functions) can be lost 
specifically as a result of a brain damage (e.g. in Imamizu, Kuroda, Miyauchi, Yoshioka, & 
Kawato, 2003; Puce, Allison, Gore, & McCarthy, 1995). Should we expect that this kind of 
organization to affect behaviors, such as IG, that rely on memory access? I see no reason to 
believe that there should be inherent, qualitative differences between domains, just acquired 
differences even if the different knowledge domains are physically localized to different cortical 
areas. And on the other extreme, we have theorists who propose that the human capacity for 
creativity is mainly derived from one cognitive structure that has provided the whole human 
race its competitive edge in the evolution. For instance, Corballis (1991) has argued that a single 
gene mutation has brought forth the human capacity for creativity, which is expressed in a 
psychological construct called Generative Assembling Device. This suggests that creative 
thinking might be domain independent and theories and evidence on domain might have 
relevance for other areas as well. 
Among design theorists, Visser (2009) has just recently proposed a cognitively-oriented 
generic-design hypothesis. Considering evidence from different design and non-design studies, 
he concludes that “the commonalities between all different forms of design thinking are 
sufficiently distinctive from the characteristics of other cognitive activities, to consider design a 
specific, generic cognitive activity.” (ibid., p. 216) From a very different perspective, 
Krippendorff’s semantic view of design (Krippendorff, 2006) makes design seem highly domain 
dependent. Following his argument, if different design domains present autonomous language 
games, does not the reality, including all forms of design, also become social constructs? This 
would render all domains with distinct vocabulary incompatible. The discourse debate has a 
strong philosophical drift, I will avoid entering it too much. I only present one counter 
argument. The view I hold relies on Kantian psychological ontology. We perceive and act on 
the world in a particular way because we are humans. Our mind is a special construct that does 
have some flexibility to realize rules of multiple language games, but it also has machinery with 
a fixed set of ‘nuts and bolts’ that make these games work. All thinking is not linguistic and in 
particular design of visual entities may be one activity in which the non-linguistic, non-
conceptual, but meaningful and functional thinking flourishes. Thus I think that the semantic 
turn does not destroy the possibility for a domain general, psychological science of design. 
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 The scope of the presented theory is also quite limited and abstract with regards to the various 
practices prevalent in modern product design. The empirical data I have brought to bear are 
derived from isolated design students working on pen and paper. One might argue that design 
thinking in situations that apply CAD and other ‘creativity support tools’ may involve and 
evoke cognitive capacities (and surely different design discourses) that are not included in the 
model. However, to my best knowledge there is no particular reason to believe that this would 
be the case, but this is clearly an empirical question worth examining. 
The empirical studies of design IG are also susceptible to other kinds of criticism. The 
challenges mentioned by Vargas Hernandez, Shah, and Smith (2007) include the inability to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant IG components and their interactions, the number of 
studies required to assess all active IG components, the inability to generalize experimental 
outcomes to different design tasks and contexts, and the poor understanding of the causal chain 
in ideation. It can be argued that the studies conducted by the same authors already provides 
evidence that experimental design research can defend itself against many points of criticism 
(Shah et al., 2000; Shah, Smith et al., 2003; Vargas Hernandez et al., 2007). The experimental 
setups applied in design studies can disclose causal relations, even though the difficult issue of 
pointing out the effective cognitive mechanisms remains. 
Problem solving in design cognition. 
The present dissertation is strongly tied to the design cognition paradigm and problem solving 
discourse. For several decades now, design has been generally conceptualized as problem 
solving (Simon, 1969). The problem solving approach has been a lively for quite long. 
However, there are concerns whether it can provide adequate answers and descriptions for all 
aspects of design. One essential difficulty is the separation of problem formulation and solution 
generation, which has led some to even propose separate problem and solution spaces (Cross, 
2007; Dorst & Cross, 2001; see also Harfield, 2007). Even if this would please the design 
investigator, it will remain hard to digest for a designer. This was stated in Publication I and has 
been described by others. Jones (1963, p. 10) writes “The difficulty is that the imagination does 
not work well unless it is free to alternate between all aspects of the problem, in any order, and 
at any time, where as logical analysis breaks down if there is the least departure from a 
systematic step-by-step sequence. It follows that any design method must permit both kinds of 
thought to proceed together if any progress is to be made. Existing methods depend largely on 
keeping logic and imagination, problem and solution, apart only by an effort of will, and their 
failures can largely be ascribed to the difficulty of keeping both these processes going 
separately in the mind of one person.” (emphasis added) The solution suggested by Jones is to 
externalize the components as they emerge and thus try to overcome the evident problem of 
juggling an increasing amount of design requirements and solutions in their memory. However, 
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 it does not sound psychologically feasible. It is questionable are there any real, non-trivial 
design ‘problems’ that can be discovered through a rational analysis only.  
Jones is not the only one who has acknowledged difficulties in the problem-solving approach. 
Thomas and Carroll (1979) discussed a new branch of science called design psychology. They 
noted that there are problems with the problem solving concepts they had chosen, however, they 
did not consider any alternatives. During the following years, both cognitive science 
philosophers (Dreyfus, 1992) and design researchers (Krippendorff, 2006; Schön, 1995) have 
come to question these kinds of accounts, each for different reasons. However, as a person 
interested in making progress to the science of design and unraveling the mental mechanisms of 
creative achievement in this area, I am concerned that that this criticism, however firm it may 
be, has not been very constructive. If we abandon the problem solving view which has produced 
a variety of interesting observations and elaborate theory, where do we turn to in order to 
achieve a psychological science of design? I belief we do not have to wipe out the problem-
solving view completely even if we would be prepared for a new paradigm of cognitive theory. 
The talks about paradigm shift in design thinking have already been introduced in this volume. 
For instance, Ylirisku et al. (2009) discusses ‘third paradigm’ or ‘situated’ accounts of design. 
However, alike Krippendorff and Schön, the discourses and vocabularies adapted by recent 
paradigm shift proposals are not foremost psychological. They rather talk about design as 
meaning construction, reflection, focusing and such. But can these concepts be translated to a 
psychological discourse, or to any other more theoretically powerful discourse? Can multiple 
discourses not co-exist if they describe different levels of activity?  
Interestingly, this issue has been acknowledged in cognitive science pondering similar problems 
in psychological science. Regarding different levels of theory, Anderson (1990) discusses an 
issue called the lack of identifiability, which is “one-to-many mapping from [algorithmic] 
mechanisms to behavioral functions, and, consequently, identifying the behavioral level will not 
identify the mechanism.” (ibid., p. 24) This partially describes also the difficulty in combining 
the rational and situated accounts of design. Although they both talk about the same phenomena, 
they do not seem to describe the activity at the same level or address the same kind of activities. 
Rather, they seem to be interested in different properties of design, in which rational approach 
associates with the investigation of ‘mechanical’ thought and mental process where as situated 
approach deals hermeneutically with the aspects of design work that can unravel themselves to a 
human observer. I think that the proper discourse for design theory may be found from a 
combination of these two. Descriptive terms from situated account, such as reflection in action 
(Schön, 1995) or focusing (Ylirisku & Buur, 2007) do not replace the need to explicate with 
what psychologically happens during and after the application of inspirational methods, and 
similarly, cognitive models of design ideation do not seem capture progressive development of 
meanings which seems to commonly occur in design. 
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 4.4 Future Work 
This work has sparked several ideas for new research and brought up areas of study largely 
uncharted. To develop the present approach further, I propose four key challenges for design 
cognition of conceptual design. The first two have been already discussed and the last two will 
be introduced in the following paragraphs. 
? Bridging rational and situated accounts of design for a comprehensive science of design 
? Rethinking problem-solution discourse 
? Developing computational model of design idea generation 
? Testing and formulating a theory of design knowledge 
Starting from theoretical developments, the research on IG models is badly short of formal 
approaches. Computational implementation of the IG model should be among the first steps in 
elaborating any of the present theories. This would be most conveniently achieved by adopting 
an existing cognitive framework, such as SOAR (Newell, 1990) or ACT-R (Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998) software architecture instead of trying to develop a full-blown cognitive 
architecture (cf. Vargas Hernandez et al., 2007) from a scratch. Computational model provides 
an effective way to test the feasibility of the proposal. The model should be able to reproduce IG 
phenomena, including semantic and temporal clustering, fixation and stimulation effects. Of 
course the purpose of the model as a portrait of the theory must be recognized. This is because 
one quickly arising naturalistic, skeptical question is that what can a computer model possibly 
tell about creative task such idea generation (cf. Boden, 2004). As of 2009 computers are 
generally not considered original thinkers. I do not expect that computers will soon be able to 
substitute human designers as idea generators (see Kurtoglu et al., 2009), but I do believe they 
could have power in assessing the internal validity of different theoretical approaches to IG. 
Several steps to this direction have been already taken, for instance Gabora (2002) presents her 
view about the relation of memory and creative thought in a bit more formal sense. Another 
reason why this has not been done this far is probably related to the state of design knowledge 
theory and modeling – the next thing on my wish list. 
Developing a theory of design knowledge in process is maybe the most important goal for 
future design cognition researchers. Although there have been plenty of research into design 
expertise (see Cross, 2004a) and to the ‘designerly’ ways of thinking (Lawson, 1979, 1990) the 
insights into the nature of design knowing are sparse. This is particularly obvious if we compare 
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 them to the requirements typically set for creating computational models. Building on the 
traditional cognitive science and artificial intelligence background, I have previously in this 
work advocated the process and knowledge dichotomy. However, maybe the present state of art 
of in design research is telling us something about the validity of this assumption. Perhaps the 
processes involved in design thinking (or know how) are more important and reflect more 
accurately the special qualities of design thinking. Maybe the continuous development of mental 
representations in visual and functional forms (cf. Visser, 2009) through various cognitive 
mechanisms is the crucial part of design knowledge and thinking. 
Besides these listed items, there are few suggestions I would like to make. These concern the 
metaphor of memory, interpretation of design tasks, surprises as parallels in science and design, 
and learning creativity. 
An important detail to this discussion concerns the concept of human memory as a store of 
knowledge. The psychological paradigm that the present work builds on is constructred on the 
tradition of controlled laboratory experiments (e.g. Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981). The 
laboratory studies that have explored how people store in and retrieve information from 
permanent memory, are all assuming a ‘recorder’ model of memory. This means that the 
memories are encoded to represent accurately their original target, a percept or mental image. In 
experiments, in which people learn lists of names, nouns, or verbs, it is very easy to evaluate 
when the recorder functions properly, memorizes and outputs the right words. This suits the 
purposes of experimental psychology quite well as the interested in accurately mapping 
different cognitive capacities. In IG models (SIAM, VHIM, CNMC, Model-L) ideation is 
equaled with a sort of free recall which may not do justice for the phenomenon.  
However, alternative, constructive memory accounts exist in psychology (for example, 
Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998). They point out that retrieval from memory is not as 
simple as playing back a record. People repeatedly recall events partially right, such as eye 
witness accounts in the court of law, or can even construct false memories of events that never 
occurred, like UFO abductees. While this happens predominantly with episodic 
(autobiographical) memories, the constructive and recorder models of memory should also be 
explored in the idea generation and design context. If constructive and generative processes 
would have a major role in recalling design knowledge, then replacing the recorder model with 
a constructive view might alter (or inform) the process of IG considerably as the processes of 
information recall and idea production might become more closely coupled. 
The idea of memory-search embedded in the present model was adapted quite directly from 
Unsworth and Engle (2007). It was already noted that details about the memory search 
regarding the nature and assembly remain vague. For the psychological theory and its 
applications in IG research, it would be valuable to understand this process. Future studies 
  81 
 should investigated effective free-recall strategies for an IG task, such as Cause-cueing 
proposed by Potter and Balthazard (2004).  
Design task interpretation is a major topic that reflects the whole discourse about how we 
think about design. The question is how design tasks become understood from the brief and 
transformed into some mental conceptions of the situation. Traditionally, this has been labeled 
as constructing the design problem or solution spaces. However, as the concept of problem 
space and design problem in general was questioned before, it also becomes even more 
challenging to set out a theory of what goes in this process. Figuring out how exactly existing 
knowledge possessed by the designers comes in contact with a new task is important for 
understanding design. Harfield (2007) has recently discussed this in length by considering how 
design tasks turn into designs. He argues that design problems are better to be thought of as 
design goals. Importantly, the definition of problem is not in direct relation to brief but contains 
multiple constraints introduced by the designer in the process of developing the ‘problem.’  
I think that this challenge connects to the previously discussed conflict of situated and rational 
approach of design. For design cognition, developing the design theory further requires 
probably some relaxation of the present theoretical constraints. To be able to consider important 
and difficult approaches such as designer intuition, a wider perspective than typically accepted 
by cognitive scientists is probably required. One possible solution might be found from the 
dual-process theories of human psychology (E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000) that describe 
cognitive functioning as an interplay of consciously controlled and effortful operation vs. almost 
automatic and swift thinking based on well-established knowledge. 
Scientific experiments have some similarities to explorations in design. Hypothetic-deductive 
science relies on empirical hypothesis testing and it can end up producing results that surprise 
the scientists. In design, at the moment when a mental plan turns into an external object, a 
design sketch, a prototype, or a draft, this may also evoke a surprise (Ylirisku & Buur, 2007). 
And the surprise may be so considerable that it leads to an enchantment, which may oppose 
often necessary criticism. The surprise is the similarity in design and science, the difference is 
the initial state. In science, the surprise may seem more natural as we may have quite poor 
hypothesis regarding images from the latest research satellite or brain imaging of cerebral 
activity during movement, so some kind of surprise is granted, but why do we become surprised 
by our own ideas? Why is perceiving something external so different than imagining an 
‘identical’ design mentally? Why is it so important to output, perceive, analyze, and revise? Is 
our predictive imagination limited because of bounded working memory capacity, and thus we 
need to externalize our ideas? Alternative approach for future studies in design cognition would 
be to consider these design activities from a situated or distributed cognition approach (Clark, 
1999; Hutchins, 1995). 
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 Acquiring or learning creative thinking in design and also in other creative disciplines remains 
very much a mystery. Is it possible and how does it happen? Even though attempts to bust the 
myth of creative genius and explicate the creative process in psychological means have been 
successful (Weisberg, 2006), the detailed trajectories of achieving success in design are largely 
unknown. This means that there would be a great opportunity to perform longitudinal (case or 
quasi-experimental) studies on individuals and design organizations on how creative practices 
are learnt, applied and developed. For instance, it could be studied that how much can designers 
develop their capacity for ideation by adopting new methods to create ideas, or otherwise trying 
to change their thinking. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In the opening paragraph of this work I claimed the design theory is in a state bewilderment. 
Did this thesis manage to reduce this entropy? My purpose has been to illustrate that there is 
unexploited potential in bringing together state of the art psychological theory and applying it to 
design research. However, I have also admitted that traditional cognitive science is not equipped 
to fully handle topics such as conceptual design even if recent developments, such as creative 
cognition movement, are considered. In my opinion, there are two ways out of this dead end. 
Either a student interesting in contributing to the science of design must drop prejudice and 
bravely leave the old and go looking for a discourse and methodology that might best help in 
achieving a better theory. Or alternatively, one can go looking, but with the eye that what ever 
comes up could be possibly integrated with what ever working solution is already available at 
hand. As a cognitive scientist, I prefer the latter option. I see cognitive science not as a 
collection of facts from 60s and 70s, but as an evolving way of thinking about complex 
information processing. Its past victories and failures should not blind us from the scientific 
realism and seeking exact answers to questions, such as, concerning human creativity in design, 
as a part of a psychological science of design. 
How did we end up in the present status quo? If we consider the level of design practices, I 
think that Krippendorff (2006) is on the right track as he announces a new era of design 
emerging from the transition from technology-centered to user-centered design. What follows 
from this tradition is essentially a break down of old design patterns. Design is changing 
because user-centered constraints have overridden technical constraints. And where as technical 
constraints could be fixed and development of new solutions temporally frozen, human-centered 
constraints seem to avoid formalization or stabilization. I agree with Krippendorff that user-
related constraints can not (or never) solely determine design, but they have a huge influence. 
Take for instance participatory design including prototypes. It is very typical that user 
requirements evolve with the prototypes as users become to grasp what the artifact really is and 
  83 
 how it concerns them. Psychologically this means that ‘wicked problems’ have just become 
more wicked and the matter of finding out what the problem is ever more complicated. From 
another perspective one could claim that these constraints are not actually new, designers have 
always imposed some similar, implicit constraints upon their work (cf. Harfield, 2007) but UCD 
has just made them explicit and emphasized their importance..  
I do not believe that social constructivism, as advocated by Krippendorff (ibid.) will become the 
true discourse of design. It may have an advantage for developing a science for design, but as a 
science of design I am inclined to favor the cognitive approach. This said, cognitive approach 
must break out of the problem solving perspective into a theory of human activity where 
situated and embodied (Clark, 1999) aspects of designing are prominent, but not mystified. This 
needs to be emphasized. Even if we include radically new parts to the psychological theory of 
design, it must be laid out in similar way as any existing problem-solving part that is of an 
ancient origin. It may be so that having a pair of hands and a pen is much more essential for 
designing than the virtue of stimulated access to long-term memory, but we need to be able to 
articulate this in plausible terms if it is to be accepted as a core part of the cognitive theory. 
I hope that future theoretical descriptions of design will be able to define concepts such as 
focusing or reflecting in cognitive terms, to find a common ground between the rational and 
situated accounts. One important aspect that they must explain is the power of externalized 
thinking, or particular situated activity, prototyping, sketching, and acting out ideas. All these 
aspects currently define the most advanced and creative design organizations. A proper theory 
of conceptual design must be able to pinpoint how they work, why they work, and what are their 
limits. The last notion will be probably the most important for designers who are pragmatically 
oriented and not just interested in browsing the design research literature to gain understanding 
how the wonderful system of human cognition keeps the cultural evolution going. 
It must be admitted that the view of design IG considered here is rather abstract and simplified. 
For this reason I have also tried to avoid talking about creativity, when ever possible. I see that 
from a simple, associative IG view of design cognition, one can develop an elaborate view in 
which conceptual design is characterized as unified development and integration of multiple 
constraints and solutions satisfying them. Rather than problem solving, design is a sustained 
process of solution/problem definition in which new constraints and solutions are continuously 
discovered and tried to fit into one big puzzle (Harfield, 2007). This is particularly true for the 
human-centered design projects. The idea of constraint satisfaction can lead us to think about 
design work and human creativity in general.  
I propose that the existence of constraints relates to a generic understanding of the world or a 
function of sense making. The constraints are adapted as a way of adapting to the regularities 
and affordances or dispositions of the world. Through learning the way world is, and maybe 
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 more importantly how it works (sense about the world or world knowledge), some groups and 
constellations of constraints become fixed. Overcoming and reconnecting these constraints 
requires creativity but also an attitude or a cognitive strategy of giving up the fixed world 
knowledge. This theoretical argument might best describe the difference in the creativity 
between children under 10 years old and adults. This difference has also been captured by 
psychometric instruments, such as Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974), 
showing that generally after ten years of age the traditional divergent thinking (as defined by 
Torrance, ibid.) gives away for restrained, norm-embracing thinking which develops more and 
more elaborate. Elaboration here means responding to a greater number of constraints or 
requirements. I see that this ever evolving embellishment is related to the accumulating amount 
of world knowledge in which the connections of even remote information become 
interconnected in a way that is coherent with the existing world. However, although the 
understanding of the world increases, the capacity for unconventional, divergent thinking 
decreases. The demands of creative thinking are thus in conflict with the typical way of human 
knowledge acquisition. And this world knowledge is just what separates humans from artificial 
intelligences according to Dreyfuss (1992). 
This view of creativity implicates that the bonds of normal thinking and sense making of the 
world must be broken down in order to enter the creative thinking domain. There are clearly 
differences between individuals in the typical capacity to perform this type of thinking. For 
some reason, some individuals are less bounded to the traditional world knowledge and are 
constantly more capable of bending the laws of the world and acting creatively. This also 
suggests that people perceived creative will more often be at odds with the conventions of the 
world. The relation of creativity and humor may be debated (O'Quin & Derks, 1997), but 
nevertheless the good humors seem to be distributed in western cultures in a similar way to high 
divergent thinking capacity. This implies that creativity might be bound to cognitive domains 
(be domain dependent) as people may not exhibit similar creativity over all areas, and may 
actually want restrain certain areas of life, certain discourses from being inventive. Consider for 
instance religious fundamentalists who despite utmost convergence and logical thinking on one 
side may be highly successful in exploring new violent methods to disseminate their message. 
Returning to more peaceful designs topics, different kinds of design creativity that may suit the 
different phases of professional design practice. Convergent thinking and convergent creativity 
may be required in situations where multiple existing constraints need to be adhered to. In 
product development, this kind of a situation might be the design of a next generation paper-
machine with an open-belt extended nip press (Saariluoma et al., 2006). But for early phases of 
conceptual design, I believe that the extensive exploration of all design opportunities, ‘divergent 
thinking’ will be more important. Hence the methods and practices that help designers to 
advance on this are desired. And therefore, to develop them, we also need a psychological 
science of design.  
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